

A Hypothetical Reconsideration of the ‘Compilation’ of *Cheng Weishi Lun**

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Abstract: *Cheng weishi lun*, or **Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* [Establishment of Mental-Representation-Only], is a systematic work on Yogācāra Buddhism that has been treated as a fundamental text in the East Asian Yogācāra (Ch. Faxiang/Jp. Hossō) tradition. Traditionally, this work is thought to be a compilation by Xuanzang (600/602–664) based on ten separate commentaries on Vasubandhu’s *Trīṃśikā vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ* [Thirty Verses for the Establishment of Mental-Representation-Only]. If one examines the content of *Cheng weishi lun*, one often finds a juxtaposition of plural opinions concerning a single issue; this indeed gives the impression that they were taken from separate commentaries. Relatively late Indian Yogācāra texts, such as *Vivṛtaguhyārthapaṇḍavyākhyā* [A Condensed Explanation of the Revealed Secret Meaning] and *Yogācārabhūmivyākhyā* [An Explanation of *Yogācārabhūmi*], however, similarly contain different interpretations of a single issue given side by side. Sometimes these Indian texts and *Cheng weishi lun* even contain comparable arguments. This makes me somewhat suspicious of the traditionally accepted notion that *Cheng weishi lun* is a ‘compilation’. Perhaps *Cheng weishi lun* is based on an Indian original that had a similar format to the current Chinese text. It is

* This article is an English translation (with modification) of a revised version of a Chinese draft I read at the First International Conference on Xuanzang & Silk

difficult to be conclusive at this stage, but I would like to present a hypothetical argument that reconsiders the textual nature and background of this important work.

Keywords: *Cheng weishi lun*, *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā*, *Yogācārabhūmivyākhyā*, Xuanzang, compilation theory, *bīja*

Introduction: *Cheng Weishi Lun* as a ‘Compilation’

Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論 (**Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, T no. 1585, [Establishment of Mental-Representation-Only]) is a highly important treatise in East Asian Yogācāra. According to the tradition of the Faxiang School (Ch. Faxiang zong/Jp. Hossō shū 法相宗), Vasubandhu himself never composed a commentary on his *Triṃśikā vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ* (*Weishi sanshi song* 唯識三十頌 [Thirty Verses for the Establishment of Mental-Representation-Only]), and commentaries on this text were instead written by the ‘ten great masters’ (*shi dalunshi* 十大論師). Fearing that translating these com-

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mentaries separately into Chinese would lead to a confusion, Ci'en 慈恩 ([Kui]ji [窺]基,¹ 632–682) advised his master Xuanzang 玄奘 (600/602–664) to compile them into a comprehensive text giving the correct interpretation of *Triṃśikā*. See the following passage from *Cheng weishi lun zhangzhong shuyao* 成唯識論掌中樞要 [Essentials of *Cheng weishi lun* in the Palm of Your Hand] by Ci'en:

My mediocre capacity notwithstanding, I finally joined the translation team. Holding wooden tablets (i.e., writing material), I received this treatise. When we first started to work, [Master Xuanzang set out to] translate the ten commentaries separately. [Shen]fang [神]昉, [Jia]shang [嘉]尚, [Pu]guang [普]光, and [Kui]ji [窺]基 received them together as embellisher, scribe, editor, and compiler [respectively]. They furnished good examples when they executed their own duties. After a few days, [I, Kui]ji asked to withdraw [from my duty]. Master naturally asked [the reason]. [I, Kui]ji respectfully entreated: ‘[Since the time Emperor Ming 明帝 (r. 57–75)] dreamed of the golden body [of the Buddha] in an evening and [Jiashe Moteng 迦葉摩騰 {Kāśyapa Mātāṅga} and Zhu Falan 竺法蘭] came [to Luo-yang 洛陽] on a white horse in the morning, talented people emerged from time to time, and wise ones followed one after another. Hearing about the five-part [Dharma body],² people prayed mentally, and holding the “eight chapters” (**Aṣṭagrantha*, i.e., *Jñānaprathāna*, [Giving Rise to Wisdom]) in thier hands, they looked toward [India] from afar. Even though they obtained the dregs of Dharma, they lost the essence of the profound origin. Now, texts were presented in the East, and [people] all witnessed the profound teaching. Also, fortunately [Master Xuanzang is] peerless anywhere and surpasses [anybody who has lived] since long ago. If he does not show his achievement by compiling [these commentaries], it should be said that a chance is missed. Furthermore, many sages

¹ For the name of this master, see He, ‘Whence Came the Name “Kuiji”’. I thank Robert Kritzer for referring me to this article.

² Namely, morality, concentration, wisdom, deliverance, and the awareness of deliverance.

compose [texts] and spread their fame in all over India. Although the writings are fully transmitted on palm leaves, the meaning is not available through a single text. Each view is different, and the reader has no recourse. In addition, people are presently becoming weaker, their lifespan shorter, and their intelligence more confused. [Their] discussions are unfocused and biased. They [may] grasp the initial message but cannot convey [what they have understood]. Please put the statements [of the ten masters] together and compile them into a single text, determining what is right and wrong and measuring the sublime law'. After a long time, [Master] finally accepted [my proposal]. Thus, it has become possible for this text to circulate. Master dismissed the three learned people with reason and bestowed it only on such a mediocre person [like me]. That is this treatise.

不以散材之質，遂得隨伍譯僚。事即操觚，餐受此論。初功之際，十釋別翻。昉、尚、光、基，四人同受。潤飾、執筆、檢文、纂義，既為令範，務各有司。數朝之後，基求退迹。大師固問，基懇請曰：‘自夕夢金容，晨趨白馬。英髦間出，靈智肩隨。聞五分以心祈，攬八蘊而遐望。雖得法門之糟粕，然失玄源之淳粹。今東出策賚，並目擊玄宗。幸復獨秀萬方，穎超千古，不立功於參糶。可謂失時者也。況群聖製作，各馳譽於五天。雖文具傳於貝葉，而義不備於一本。情見各異，稟者無依。況時漸人澆，命促惠舛。討支離而頗究，攬初旨而難宣。請錯綜群言以為一本，指定真謬，權衡盛則。久而遂許，故得此論行焉。大師理遣三賢，獨授庸拙此論也。’ (T no. 1831, 43: 1.608b28–c14)³

See also the excerpts from the preface to *Cheng weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記 [A Commentary on *Cheng weishi lun*], also by Ci'en, quoted below:

The Thirty Verses is one of the ten subordinate texts⁴ composed by Bodhisattva Vasubandhu. ... Before he composed a commentary, he passed away. ... Here, there were ten great bodhisattvas such as Dharmapāla (530–61?). ... Uttering beautiful sounds, spreading excellent

³ Emphasis added by the author (here and below).

⁴ See Dhammajoti, 'Introduction', 29 and note 8.

commentaries, and purifying the true consciousness, they composed this refined treatise. It is entitled *Cheng weishi lun* [Establishment of Mental-Representation-Only] and is also called *Jing weishi lun* [Purification of Mental-Representation-Only]. ... Only my own master, the Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang [has compiled these commentaries into a single text]. ... This text is a compilation of various portions of the ten commentaries. Now [Xuanzang] has collected the full translations and compiled them into a single text. [While compiling this text, he] has examined Chinese and Sanskrit, selected the important from the trivial, and organized the differences among various opinions. Thus, the text is like one composed by a single master.⁵ ‘Establishment of Mental-Representation-Only’ is a comprehensive title denoting the entirety of the text.

唯識三十頌者，十支中之一支。天親菩薩之所製也。……釋文未就歸真上遷，……爰有護法等十大菩薩，……振金聲而流妙釋，淨彼真識，成斯雅論，名曰‘成唯識論’，或名‘淨唯識論’。……惟我親教三藏法師玄奘，……斯本彙聚，十釋群分。今總詳譯糅爲一部，商推華、梵，徵詮輕、重。陶甄諸義之差，有叶一師之製。成唯識者，舉宏綱旌一部之都目。(T no. 1830, 43: 1.229a12–b18)⁶

⁵ Cf. a partial English translation of this passage by Dhamajoti, ‘Introduction’, 29.

⁶ Cf. also the following passage from ‘*Cheng weishi lun houxu*’ 成唯識論後序 [Postface to *Cheng weishi lun*] by Chen Xuanming 沈玄明 from Wuxing 吳興 (Tang period):

I think Vasubandhu was an arhat of our period (賢劫, *bhadrakalpa*)... *The Thirty Verses on Mental-Representation-Only* was Vasubandhu’s last work before his decease. ... Afterwards, there were ten great bodhisattvas, like Dharmapāla and Sthiramati, etc. ... They all contemplated these root verses and respectively composed their commentaries, entitled, ‘*A Treatise for Establishing [the Doctrine of] Mental-Representation-Only*,’ or ‘*A Treatise for Purifying [the Doctrine of] Mental-Representation-Only*.’ Now, the Great Preceptor, Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang ... turned a white horse back to the Shaanxi area (in this context, Chag’an). ... He combined these ten commentaries consisting of four thousand and five hundred lines. He collected

Based on these accounts, *Cheng weishi lun* is usually considered to be a ‘compilation’ by Xuanzang of the ten great masters’ commentaries on *Triṃśikā vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ*, centering on Dharmapāla’s position. When one looks into this text, one finds that plural opinions on a single issue are frequently juxtaposed, which gives one the impression that these opinions indeed derive from separate commentaries. Thus, the structure of *Cheng weishi lun* seems to support the accounts of its compilation.⁷

1. *Vivṛtaguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā* and *Cheng Weishi Lun*: On the Origin of Seeds

Indian Yogācāra commentaries that are apparently relatively late, such as *Vivṛtaguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā* (*Don gsang ba rnam par phyed ba bshad pa* [A Condensed Explanation of the Revealed Secret Meaning]⁸, Derge No. 4052; Pek. No. 5553) and *Yogācārabhūmivyākhyā* (*rNal ’byor spyod pa’i sa rnam par bshad pa* [Explanation of *Yogācārabhūmi*], Derge No. 4043; Pek. No. 5544 [An Explanation of *Yogācārabhūmi*]), also arrange examples of different opinions about the origin of seeds of consciousness side

various portions, each conforming to the original texts, into a single text, and compiled ten fascicles. ... He used the same style even for [describing] different views, so that it looks as if composed by a single master. This conforms to the method of ancient saints and modern sages.

茲惟世親，寔賢劫之應真。……《唯識三十偈》者，世親歸根之遺製也。……後有護法安慧等十大菩薩，……咸觀本頌，各裁斯釋。名曰《成唯識論》，或名《淨唯識論》。……粵若大和上三藏法師玄奘，……旋白馬於三秦。……糴茲十釋四千五百頌，彙聚群分，各遵其本。合為一部，勒成十卷。……遂使文同義異，若一師之製焉。斯則古聖今賢，其揆一也。(T no. 1585, 31:59b13–60a1)

⁷ In addition to these historical accounts, modern scholars have often suspected that Xuanzang has contributed significantly to *Cheng weishi lun*, for example, Sakuma, ‘Genjō’, 22–23. Dhammajoti, ‘Introduction’, 31–49.

⁸ I follow the English translation of the title in Brunnhölzl, *A Compendium of the Mahāyāna*, vii.

by side. More pertinently, some of these juxtaposed opinions that are found in the Indian texts are similar to those presented in *Cheng weishi lun*.

First, I look at *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā*, a highly technical but incomplete commentary on Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgraha* [Compendium of Mahāyāna],⁹ the author, translator, and date of which are all unknown.¹⁰ The Tibetan translation remains the only extant version. Nagao Gadjin 長尾雅人 suspected that there are elements within this text that suggest the influence of Chinese Buddhism.¹¹ However, recent Japanese scholars in general do not doubt the text's Indian (or Central Asian) origin.¹²

In the detailed discussions of seeds (called *yinsō kōshaku* 因相廣釋 in the Japanese Hossō tradition) found in the section on the 'first agent of transformation' (*chunengbian* 初能變, i.e. *ālayavijñāna*) of *Cheng weishi lun*, there is a discussion of the origin of the seeds (*zhongzi* 種子, *bīja*) of all elements (*fa* 法, dharmas), namely, whether they are 'primordial' (*benyou* 本有) or 'engendered anew through infusion' (*xinxun* 新熏). Three positions are recorded in *Cheng weishi lun*: (1) there are only primordial seeds, (2) there are only newly generated seeds, and (3) there are both primordial and newly generated seeds. In Ci'en's *Cheng weishi lun shuji*, the first theory is attributed to 'Huyue 護月 (Candrapāla), etc.', the second to 'Shengjun 勝軍 (Jayasena), Nantuo 難陀 (Nanda), etc.', and the third to 'Hufa 護法 (Dharmapāla) himself'.^{12a} *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* also contains three similar theories.

First, I translate the relevant portions in the original order, as

⁹ This commentary covers only up to *Mahāyānasamgraha* §I.49. See Nagao, *Shōdaijōron*, 50–51.

¹⁰ See Hakamaya, '*Mahāyānasamgraha', 281; Chiba, '*Higi funbetsu shōsho* (1)', 209. Ōtake, 'Inyō bunken', 126 suggests that *Vivṛtapīṇḍārthaguhavyākhyā* is earlier than *Cheng weishi lun*.

¹¹ Nagao, *Shōdaijōron*, 51.

¹² For example, Ōtake, 'Inyō bunken', 125–26; Ōtake, 'Buha Bukkyō setsu', 94.

^{12a} See *Shuji*, T no. 1830, 43: 2.304b5–305c25. On this discussion, see Yamabe, 'Shūji no honnu to shinkun', 'Shūji no honnu to shinkun (II)'.

explained in *Cheng weishi lun* and *Vivrtaguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā*. Following the translations, I compare the individual elements of these theories in tables.

2. First Theory: All Seeds are Primordial

2.1. Translations

2.1.1. *Cheng weishi lun*:

Regarding this, some [Yogācāras] maintain that all seeds exist by nature (*benxing you* 本性有, **prakṛtistha*). They do not arise through infusion (*xun[xi]* 熏[習], *paribhāvanā*) but can only be fostered through infusion. As is said in a *sūtra*: ‘From time immemorial, all sentient beings have various kinds of *dhātus* (*jie* 界). They exist naturally like a heap *akṣa* nuts (*echa* 惡叉, ‘myrobalan’).¹³ Here the word *dhātu* is another appellation for seed (*zhongzi* 種子, *bīja*). Another *sūtra* (*Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra*) says: ‘*Dhātu* from time immemorial is the support for all dharmas’.¹⁴ The word *dhātu* here means cause (*yin* 因, *betu*). *Yogā[cārabbūmi]* also says: ‘Although the seeds themselves exist by nature, they are infused anew (by pure and defiled [dharmas])’¹⁵; ‘sentient beings destined for *nirvāṇa*’ (*boniepan fa* 般涅槃法, *parinirvāṇadharmaka*) are, from time immemorial, endowed with all the seeds; but those who are not destined for *nirvāṇa* (*bu boniepan fa* 不般涅槃法, *aparinirvāṇadharmaka*) are devoid of the seeds of the three kinds of bodhis (*sanzhong puti* 三

¹³ On this *sūtra*, see Yamabe, ‘Shoki Yugagyōha’.

¹⁴ *anādikāliko dhātuḥ sarvadharmasamāśrayaḥ | tasmin sati gatiḥ sarvā nirvāṇādhigamo ’pi ca ||* (Buescher, ed., *Triṃśikāvī-jñaptibhāṣya*, 116.1–2).

¹⁵ *sa ca bījasantānaprabandho ’nādikālikaḥ | anādikālikatve ’pi śubhāsubhakaraviśeṣaparibhāvanayā punaḥ punar vipākaphalaparigrahān navī bhavati |* (Bhattacharya, ed., *Manobbūmi, Yogācārabbūmi*, 25.20–26.1).

又種子體，無始時來，相續不絕。性雖無始有之，然由淨不淨業差別熏發。望數數取異熟果，說彼為新。(T no. 1579, 30: 2.284b19–21).

種菩提, *trividhabodhi*).¹⁶ Thus, the textual passages confirming [the existence of primordial seeds, both defiled and undefiled] are many. In addition, [regarding the undefiled seeds, *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* says:] ‘Sentient beings primordially have five distinct *gotras* ([the undefiled seeds that determine] spiritual lineage)’.¹⁷ Thus, there definitely are natural seeds (*fa’er zhongzi* 法爾種子, **dharmatābija*), which are not generated through infusion. Also, according to *Yogā[cārabhūmi]*: ‘hell beings (*diyu* 地獄, **nāraka*) are endowed with three undefiled faculties (*gen* 根, *indriyas*). These refer to faculties in the seed [state], not to activated [faculties]’.¹⁸ In addition, [*Bodhisattvabhūmi* states:] ‘The [bodhisattva-]*gotra* that is present by nature (*benxingzhu* 本性住, *prakṛtistha*) has been transmitted in succession since time immemorial and has been acquired naturally (*fa’er suode* 法爾所得, *dharmatāpratīlabdha*)’.¹⁹ Based on these scriptural passages, [we can conclude that] the undefiled seeds exist naturally and primordially.

¹⁶ See the passage from *Manobhūmi* (Bhattacharya, ed., *Yogācārabhūmi*, 25.1–2) quoted below in this paper.

¹⁷ punar aparāṃ mahāmate pañcābhisamayagoṭrāṇi / katamāni pañca yad uta śrāvakayānābhisamayagoṭraṃ pratyekabuddhayānābhisamayagoṭraṃ tathāgatayānābhisamayagoṭraṃ aniyataikataragoṭraṃ agotaṃ ca pañcamam / (Nanjio, ed., *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, 63.2–5).

復次大慧，有五種種性。何等爲五？調聲聞乘種性，緣覺乘種性，如來乘種性，不定種性，無種性。（T no. 972, 16: 2.597a29–b2）。

¹⁸ sems can dmyal bar skyes pa du dag dang ldan zhe na / smras pa / ... gsum dang ni ku tu ’byung ba las ni mi ldan pa la sa bon las ni gal te yong su mya ngan las ’da’ ba’i chos can ni ldan no // gal te yong su mya ngan las ’da’ ba’i chos can ma yin na ni mi ldan no // (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, *Yogācārabhūmi*, Pek. Zi. 95b8–96a2).

問，生那落迦，成就幾根？答：...三約現行不成就，約種子或成就，謂般涅槃法；或不成就，謂不般涅槃法。（T no. 1579, 30: 57.615a27–b1）。

¹⁹ tatra prakṛtisthaṃ goṭraṃ yad bodhisattvānām ṣaḍāyatanaviśeṣaḥ. sa tādrśaḥ paramparāgato ’nādikāliko dharmatāpratīlabdhaḥ (Wogihara, ed., *Bodhisattvabhūmiḥ*, 3.2–4).

本性住種姓者，謂諸菩薩，六處殊勝。有如是相，從無始世，展轉傳來，法爾所得，是名本性住種姓。（T no. 1579, 30: 478c13–15）。

They are not generated through infusion. Defiled seeds must also exist naturally. They are fostered through infusion, but they do not come into being specifically through infusion. In this way, causal links are established without confusion.²⁰

此中有義，一切種子，皆本性有，不從熏生。由熏習力，但可增長。如契經說，一切有情，無始時來，有種種界。如惡又聚，法爾而有。界即種子差別名故。又契經說，無始時來界，一切法等依。界是因義。瑜伽亦說，諸種子體無始時來，性雖本有，而由染淨，新所熏發。諸有情類，無始時來，若般涅槃法者，一切種子皆悉具足。不般涅槃法者，便闕三種菩提種子。如是等文，誠證非一。又諸有情，既說本有，五種性別故，應定有法爾種子，不由熏生。又瑜伽說，地獄成就三無漏根，是種非現。又從無始展轉傳來，法爾所得，本性住性。由此等證無漏種子，法爾本有，不從熏生，有漏亦應法爾有種。由熏增長，不別熏生。如是建立，因果不亂。(T no. 1585, 31: 2.8a20–b6)

2.1.2. *Vivṛtaguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā*:

Some [Yogācāras] say: ‘Imprints (*bag chags*, *vāsanā*) do not depend on infusion but are present naturally (*chos nyid kyis gnas*). They are merely fostered through arising and perishing simultaneously with desire, etc.; they are not [newly] generated’.²¹ It is thus: [Imprints are not newly generated] because the causes (*rgyu mtshan*, *nimitta*) of *ālayavijñāna* and of the arising of the noble paths (i.e., undefiled wisdom) are primordial *gotras*. If one maintains that the imprints are generative causes (*rgyu’i rkyen*, *hetupratyaya*), it is impossible for these [*ālayavijñāna* and the noble paths that should infuse their imprints] to arise and perish simultaneously [with the *ālayavijñāna* that receives the infusion] and generate their own imprints. This is because no two *ālayavijñānas* can meet [which is a prerequisite for

²⁰ Cf. Sangpo and Chödrön, trans., *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*, 226–29.

²¹ Cf. ‘dod chags la sogs pa la spyod pa rnam kyis ‘dod chags la sogs pa’i bag chags ‘dod chags la sogs pa dang lhan cig ‘byung zhing ‘gags kyang sems ni de’i rgu mtshan nyid du byung ba dang / ... (Nagao, ed., *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §I.15, 23).

She dashenglun ben 攝大乘論本, T no. 1294, 31: 1.134c5–7: 又如所立貪等行者，貪等薰習，依彼貪等，俱生俱滅。此心帶彼生因而生。

the simultaneous arising and perishing of the infuser and the infused that is necessary for the infusion of imprints], and because the noble paths are not experienced [by unawakened beings, and thus it is impossible for undefiled wisdom to arise and infuse its imprints]. [On the other hand], what fosters [naturally existent imprints] can be dissimilar [to what is fostered], and thus this [type of fostering] is not contradictory.²²

kha cig na re bag chags ni sgo bar byed pa la²³ mi ltos²⁴ par chos nyid kyis²⁵ gnas la 'dod chags la sogs pa²⁶ lhan cig skye ba dang 'gag pas ni yongs su gso ba 'ba' zhig tu zad kyi skyed pa²⁷ ni ma yin no²⁸ zhes zer ro // de ni de ltar²⁹ yin te / 'di ltar kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa dang / 'phags pa'i lam skye ba'i rgyu mtshan nyid ni rang bzhin gyi rigs te / rgyu'i rkyen nyid du bag chags yin par khas len na / de dag ni lhan cig skye ba dang 'gag pas rang gyi bag chags skyed par mi srid de / kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa gnyis 'phrad³⁰ pa med pa'i phyir dang³¹ 'phags pa'i lam yang 'dris pa ma yin pa'i^{31a} phyir ro // yongs su gso bar byed pa ni³² mi 'dra ba³³ yang 'gyur bas de ni mi 'gal lo / (Derge Ri 328a7–b3; Pek. Li 394a6–b1)

²² An English translation is found in Brunnhölzl, *A Compendium of the Mahāyāna*, 871–72. Although the translation of this text in the present paper is made by myself, I have referred to Brunnhölzl's English translation throughout.

²³ D. adds *ni*.

²⁴ Pek. *bltos*.

²⁵ D. *kyi*.

²⁶ D. adds *la*.

²⁷ D. *skye ba*.

²⁸ Pek. adds *//*.

²⁹ Pek. adds *de ltar*.

³⁰ D. *phrad*.

³¹ Pek. adds */*.

^{31a} D. *ba'i(?)*

³² D. *na*.

³³ D. *bar*.

2.2. Comparative Tables

Now I shall compare individual elements of these theories. Since the discussion in *Cheng weishi lun* is already widely known, the tables below follow the sequence in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā*. Not all the elements in the relevant portion of *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* have direct counterparts in the corresponding portion of *Cheng weishi lun*. However, comparable arguments are sometimes found in other parts of *Cheng weishi lun* or in Chinese commentaries belonging to the Faxiang tradition. When I refer to these arguments, I mark them ‘Elsewhere’.

TABLE 1 First Theory: Primordial Seeds, Thesis³⁴

<i>Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā</i>	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
<p>Some [Yogācāras] say: ‘Imprints (<i>bag chags, vāsanā</i>) do not depend on infusion but are present naturally (<i>chos nyid kyis gnas</i>). They are merely fostered through arising and perishing simultaneously with desire, etc.; they are not [newly] generated’.</p> <p><i>kha cig na re bag chags ni sgo bar byed pa la mi ltos par chos nyid kyis gnas la 'dod chags la sogs pa lhan cig skye ba dang 'gag pas ni yongs su gso ba 'ba' zhig tu zad kyis skyed pa ni ma yin no zhes zer ro //</i></p>	<p>Regarding this, some [Yogācāras] maintain that all seeds exist by nature (<i>benxing you</i> 本性有, *<i>prakṛtistha</i>). They do not arise through infusion (<i>xun[xi]</i> 熏 [習]) but can only be fostered through infusion.</p> <p>此中有義一切種子, 皆本性有, 不從熏生。由熏習力, 但可增長。</p>

In Table 1, ‘present naturally’ (*chos nyid kyis gnas*) in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* corresponds to ‘exist by nature’ (*benxing you* 本性有) in *Cheng weishi lun*. ‘They are only fostered through arising and perishing simultaneously with desire, etc.’ in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* must have the same meaning as ‘they

³⁴ In the tables in this paper, in principle I omit the page references to the quoted passages, because most of them have been already quoted above. When I quote passages not quoted before, I give the page references. Here and below, emphases are added by the present author.

do not arise through infusion but can be only fostered through infusion' in *Cheng weishi lun*. *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* uses the word 'imprint' (*vāsanā*), while *Cheng weishi lun* uses 'seed' (*bīja*), but in the established Yogācāra system, these two terms are used synonymously.³⁵ Therefore, the relevant discussions in these texts agree well.

TABLE 2 First Theory: Primordial Seeds, Explanation

<i>Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā</i>	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
<p>It is thus: [Imprints are not newly generated] because the causes (<i>rgyu mtsban, nimitta</i>) of <i>ālayavijñāna</i> and ... <i>de ni de ltar yin te / 'di ltar kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa dang /</i></p>	<p>(<i>Elsewhere</i>) The second [agent of transformation] is [consciousness as] a result that transforms itself [into various dharmas]. Namely, due to the power of the two types of imprints mentioned above, when the eight types of consciousness arise, they manifest in various forms. Due to the homogeneous imprints as generative cause (<i>yinyuan</i> 因緣, <i>hetupratyaya</i>), distinct bodies and attributes of the eight [types of] consciousness arise. They are called homogeneous results, because the results are similar to [their] causes. 二果能變，謂前二種習氣力故，有八識生，現種種相。等流習氣，為因緣故，八識體相，差別而生，名等流果，果似因故。(T no. 1585, 31: 2.7c4–7)</p>
<p>the causes (<i>rgyu mtsban, nimitta</i>) of the arising of the noble paths (i.e., undefiled wisdom) are primordial <i>gotras</i>. <i>'phags pa'i lam skye ba'i rgyu mtsban nyid ni rang bzhin gyi rigs te /</i></p>	<p>'sentient beings destined for <i>nirvāṇa</i>' (<i>boniepan fa</i> 般涅槃法, <i>parinirvāṇadharmaka</i>) are, from time immemorial, endowed with all the seeds; but those who are not destined for <i>nirvāṇa</i> (<i>bu boniepan fa</i> 不般涅槃法, <i>aparinirvāṇadharmaka</i>) are devoid of the seeds of the three kinds of <i>bodhis</i> (<i>sanzhong puti</i> 三種菩提, <i>trividhabodhi</i>)... 'The [bodhisattva-]gotra that is present by nature (<i>benxingzhu</i> 本性住, <i>praktistha</i>) has been transmitted in succession</p>

³⁵ See Yamabe, 'Shūji no honnu to shinkun', 53–54.

since time immemorial and has been acquired naturally (*fa'er suode* 法爾所得, *dharmatāpratilabddha*). Based on these scriptural passages, [we can conclude] that the undefiled seeds exist naturally and primordially.

諸有情類，無始時來，若般涅槃法者，一切種子，皆悉具足。不般涅槃法者，便闕三種菩提種子。……又從無始展轉傳來法爾所得本性住性，由此等證無漏種子，法爾本有，不從熏生。

In Table 2, *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* makes two points concerning the imprints of *ālayavijñāna* and the imprints of the noble paths (i.e., undefiled wisdom): (1), *Ālayavijñāna*, as a kind of consciousness, arises from imprints. These imprints must be present by nature. (2) The undefiled (*anāsrava*) imprints of the noble paths must also be present by nature.

There is no direct counterpart for these arguments in the ‘detailed explanation of seeds’ in *Cheng weishi lun*. As part of the explanation of ‘[consciousness as] a result that transforms itself [into various dharmas]’ (*guonengbian* 果能變, *phalaparīṇāma*), however, *Cheng weishi lun* indicates that the ‘distinct bodies and attributes of the eight [types of] consciousness’ (*bashi tixiang* 八識體相; including the body and attributes of *ālayavijñāna*, the eighth type of consciousness) arise from ‘homogeneous imprints’ (*dengliu xiqi* 等流習氣, *niṣyandavāsanā*). The idea that *ālayavijñāna* arises from its own seeds is therefore also found in *Cheng weishi lun*.

As for the explanations of the second argument, the ‘noble paths’ (*āryamārga*, which are tantamount to undefiled wisdom in Buddhist doctrinal system) in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* corresponds to bodhi (*puti* 菩提) in *Cheng weishi lun*, and the *gotra* of *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* corresponds to the ‘undefiled seeds’ (*wulou zhongzi* 無漏種子, *anāsrava-bīja*) in *Cheng weishi lun*. In this regard, the two texts agree.

TABLE 3 First Theory: Infusion

<i>Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā</i>	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
<p>If one maintains that the imprints are generative causes, it is impossible for these [<i>ālayavijñāna</i> and the noble paths that should infuse their imprints] to <u>arise and perish simultaneously</u> [with the <i>ālayavijñāna</i> that receives the infusion] and generate their own imprints. This is because no two <i>ālayavijñānas</i> can meet [which is a prerequisite for the simultaneous arising and perishing of the infuser and the infused that is necessary for the infusion of imprints], ...</p> <p><i>rgyu'i rkyen nyid du bag chags yin par kbas len na / de dag ni lhan cig skye ba dang 'gag pas rang gyi bag chags skyed par mi srid de / kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa gnyis 'phrad pa med pa'i phyir dang</i></p>	<p>(<i>Elsewhere</i>, in the section on the four requirements to be infusers [<i>nengxun</i> 能熏]) Infusion (<i>xunxi</i> 薰習) becomes possible if the infuser and the infused <u>arise and perish simultaneously</u>. [Thus, the infuser] generates and fosters seeds in the infused, like scenting sesame [oil with flowers]. For that reason, [this process] is called infusion (lit., scenting). When consciousness as the infuser arises from its seed, it can again infuse its seed. The three factors (seed that generates an active dharma, the active dharma thus arisen, and the seed deposited by that active dharma) mutually cause each other simultaneously. It is just like a wick that generates a flame, and the flame that burns the wick. It is also like bundles of reeds that support one another. [Thus] the principle of simultaneous causality is unshakable.³⁶</p> <p>(能熏四義) 如是能熏，與所熏識，俱生俱滅，熏習義成。令所熏中種子生長，如熏苴勝，故名熏習。能熏識等，從種生時，即能為因，復熏成種。三法展轉，因果同時。如炷生焰，焰生焦炷。亦如蘆束，更互相依，因果俱時，理不傾動。(T no. 1585, 31: 2.10a2–7)</p>

The first argument in the passage from *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* shown in Table 3 is as follows: In order to infuse imprints into *ālayavijñāna*, there must be a simultaneous arising and perishing of both the infuser (corresponding to *nengxun* 能熏 in *Cheng weishi lun*) and the infused (corresponding to *suoxun* 所熏). In order for imprints of *ālayavijñāna* to be newly generated, there must be a second *ālayavijñāna* that infuses its own imprints. In fact, there is

³⁶ Cf. Sangpo and Chödrön, trans. *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*, 253–54.

no such second *ālayavijñāna*. Therefore, other than the primordial and pre-existing imprints, no other imprint can give rise to *ālayavijñāna*.

There is no direct counterpart to this argument in the corresponding portion of *Cheng weishi lun*, but the idea that in order to infuse imprints in general, the infuser and the infused must arise and perish simultaneously is found in the section on ‘the four requirements to be infusers’ of this treatise (quoted in the right column; see also n. 21).

TABLE 4 First Theory: Undefined Seeds

<i>Vivrtagubhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā</i>	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
<p>... and because noble paths are unexperienced [by unawakened beings, and thus it is impossible for undefiled wisdom to arise and infuse the imprints of the noble paths].³⁷ [On the other hand], what fosters [naturally existent imprints] can be dissimilar [to what is fostered], and thus this [type of fostering] is not contradictory.</p> <p><i>’phags pa’i lam yang ’dris pa ma yin pa’i phyr ro // yongs su gso bar byed pa ni mi ’dra ba yang ’gyur bas de ni mi ’gal lo /</i></p>	<p>In addition, [regarding the undefiled seeds, <i>Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra</i> says:] ‘Sentient beings primordially have five distinct <i>gotras</i> (the undefiled seeds that determine the spiritual lineage)’. Thus, definitely there are natural seeds (<i>fa’er zhongzi</i> 法爾種子, *<i>dharmatābija</i>), which are not generated owing to infusion. Also, according to <i>Yogā[cārabhūmi]</i>, hell beings (<i>diyu</i> 地獄, *<i>nāraka</i>) are endowed with three undefiled faculties (<i>gen</i> 根, <i>indriyas</i>). These refer to faculties in the seed [state], not to actual [faculties]. In addition, [<i>Bodhisattvabhūmi</i> states:] ‘The [bodhisattva-]gotra that is present by nature (<i>prakṛistha</i>) has been transmitted in succession since time immemorial and has been acquired naturally (<i>dharmatā-pratilabdha</i>).’ Based on these scriptural passages, [we can conclude] that the undefiled seeds exist naturally and primordially. They are not generated</p>

³⁷ I think the underlying idea is that the infuser and the infused seed must agree in terms of their nature. According to the six requirements for seeds (*zhongzi liuyi* 種子六義) in *Cheng weishi lun*, what have distinct nature of good, bad, etc., corresponding to the original infuser can be seeds. 四性決定。謂隨因力生善惡等功能決定方成種子。此遮餘部執異性因生異性果有因緣義。 (*Cheng weishi lun*, T no. 1585, 31: 2.9b19–22).

through infusion. Defiled seeds must also exist naturally. They are fostered through infusion, but they do not come into being specifically through infusion. In this way, causal links are established without confusion.

又諸有情，既說本有，五種性別故，應定有法爾種子，不由熏生。又瑜伽說，地獄成就，三無漏根，是種非現。又從無始展轉傳來，法爾所得，本性住性，由此等證無漏種子，法爾本有，不從熏生。有漏亦應，法爾有種。由熏增長，不別熏生，如是建立，因果不亂。

The purport of the second argument in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā* shown in Table 4 should be as follows: Unawakened people (ordinary people, *prthagjanas*) who have not yet reached the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*) have not experienced the noble paths (or undefiled wisdom).³⁸ Therefore, the simultaneous arising and perishing of the noble path as infuser and *ālayavijñāna* as the infused is impossible. Neither is it reasonable for an unawakened person to be able to infuse imprints of the noble paths in his *ālayavijñāna*. For these reasons, the undefiled imprints of the noble paths must be pre-existing. What fosters pre-existing undefiled imprints can be something dissimilar (in this context it must refer to defiled [*sāsrava*, *youlou* 有漏] mundane wisdom). *Cheng weishi lun* also seems to presuppose a similar view (see also Tables 7, 13 and 17).³⁹

³⁸ See the discussion of Table 2.

³⁹ Here, too, the terminological difference between the subjects in these two texts is noteworthy, namely, ‘seed’ (*zhongzi* 種子, *bīja*) in *Cheng weishi lun* and ‘imprints’ (*bag chags*, *vāsanā*) in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā*, but I will not delve into it here. See also the discussion of Table 1 above. As I have already discussed in my ‘Shūji no honnu to shinkun no mondai ni tsuite’, the word *xiqi* 習氣 (*vāsanā*) is closely associated with the second theory in *Cheng weishi lun* (‘newly infused seeds’). For this reason, ‘the imprint that exists naturally’ sounds somewhat unnatural to me. The expression *benyou xunxi* 本有熏習 (primordial imprint) is found also in the Faxiang tradition (*Yuqiulun ji* 瑜伽論記, T no. 1828, 42: 13.615a1; quoted in Schmithausen, *Genesis*, 591). In any case, in the relevant

3. Second theory: All Seeds are Newly Deposited

3.1. Translations

3.1.1. *Cheng weishi lun*:

Other [Yogācāras] maintain that all seeds are generated as a result of infusion. The infuser and the infused both have existed from time immemorial. Therefore, seeds have been established from time immemorial. ‘Seed’ is another appellation for ‘imprint’, and imprints always await infusion (lit. scenting), just like the fragrance in sesame [oil] that is generated because it has been scented by flowers.⁴⁰ As is said in a *sūtra*: ‘Because the minds of sentient beings are infused by defiled and pure dharmas, boundless seeds are accumulated therein’. The treatise (*Mahāyānasamgraha*) says: ‘Internal seeds always presuppose infusion. External seeds sometimes do and sometimes do not’⁴¹; ‘The three kinds of imprints, those of verbalization, etc., encompass all seeds of defiled dharmas.’⁴² These three exist due to infusion. Therefore, defiled seeds are always generated through

portion, *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* consistently uses *bag chags* (*vāsanā*), and I follow the usage of this text.

⁴⁰ Cf. *bag chags zhes bya ba ’di ci zhig / ... dper na til dag la me tog gis bsgos pa til dang me tog lhan cig ’bung zing ’gags kyang til rnam de’i dri gzhan ’byung ba’i rgyu mtshan nyid du ’byung ba dang / ...* (Nagao, ed., *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §I.15, 23).

She dashenglun ben, T no. 1594, 31: 1.134c2–5: 復次何等名爲薰習?...如苴勝中, 有花薰習. 苴勝與華, 俱生俱滅. 是諸苴勝, 帶能生彼香因而生.

⁴¹ *phyi rol sa bon ma btab pa’am //*

nang gi ’dod pa ma yin te // (Nagao, ed., *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §I.25, 30).

She dashenglun ben, T no.1594, 31: 1.135b5: 外或無熏習 非內種應知.

⁴² *de la bag chags rnam pa gsum gyi bye brag gis rnam pa gsum ste / (1) mngon par brjod pa’i bag changs kyi bye brag dang / (2) bdag tu lta ba’i bag chags kyi bye brag dang / (3) srid pa’i yan lag gi bag chags kyi bye brag bis so //* (Nagao, ed., *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §I.58, 32).

She dashenglun ben, T no. 1594, 31: 1.137a29–b2: 此中三種者, 謂三種熏習差別故, 一名言熏習差別, 二我見熏習差別, 三有支熏習差別.

infusion. Undefined seeds are also generated through infusion. It is stated [in *Mahāyānasamgraha*] that the ‘imprints of hearing’ are infused and generated through hearing the true Dharma, which is a homogeneous outflow from the purest Dharmadhātu. These are the seeds of supramundane mind.⁴³ The original *gotra* distinctions among sentient beings are not [determined] by the presence or absence of undefiled seeds. These [distinctions] are established due to the presence or absence of hindrances. As [the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* (The Collection of Doctrinal Exegeses) section of] *Yogā[cārabhūmi]* states: If [beings] have seeds of the two [kinds of] ultimate hindrances to *tathatā* as object, they are not destined for *nirvāṇa*. If [beings] have seeds of the ultimate hindrance to the knowable but do not have [seeds of the hindrance of] defilements, some of them are called [those who have] *śrāvaka-gotra*, while the others are called [those who have] *pratyekabuddha-gotra*. If [beings] have no seed of either [kind of] ultimate hindrance, they are called [those who have] *tathāgata-gotra*.⁴⁴ Therefore, it is known that the

⁴³ chos kyi dbyings shin tu rnam par dag pa’i rgyu mtshun pa thos pa’i bag chags kyi sa bon las de ’byung ngo. / (Nagao, ed., *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §I.45, 45).

She dashenglun ben, T no.1594, 31: 1.136c3–4: 從最清淨法界等流，正聞熏習種子所生。

⁴⁴ smras pa / sgrib pa dang / sgrib pa med pa’i bye brag gi phyir te / gang dag la de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa’i rkyen rtogs par bya ba la gtan du sgrib pa’i sa bon yod pa de dag ni yongs su mya ngan las mi ’da’ ba’i chos can gyi rigs dang ldan par rnam par gzhag# la / gang dag de lta## ma yin pa de dag ni yongs su mya ngan las ’da’ ba’i chos can gyi rigs dang ldan par rnam par gzhag go // gang dag la### shes bya’i sgrib pa’i#### sa bon gtan du ba lus la zhen##### pa yod la / nyon mongs pa’i sgrib pa’i sa bon ni med pa de dag las kha cig ni nyan thos kyi rigs can yin la / kha cig ni rang sangs rgyas kyi rigs can yin par rnam par gzhag go // gang dag##### de lta ma yin pa de dag ni de bzhin gshegs pa’i rigs can yin par rnam par gzhag ste / de’i phyir nyes pa med do // (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, D. Zhi 27b6–28a2; Pek. Zi 30b3–6).

Pek. *bzhag*.

Pek. omits *lta*.

D. adds *de*.

original *gotra* distinctions are determined based on the hindrances and not on undefiled seeds. The statement [in *Yogācārabhūmi*]: ‘[hell beings] are endowed with undefiled seeds’⁴⁵ refers to seeds that can arise in the future and not to those that already exist.⁴⁶

有義種子，皆熏故生。所熏能熏，俱無始有。故諸種子，無始成就。種子既是習氣異名，習氣必由熏習而有。如麻香氣，花熏故生。如契經說，諸有情心，染淨諸法所熏習故。無量種子之所積集，論說內種定有熏習；外種熏習或有或無。又名言等三種熏習，總攝一切有漏法種，彼三既由熏習而有。故有漏種，必藉熏生。無漏種生，亦由熏習。說聞熏習，聞淨法界等流正法而熏起故，是出世心種子性故。有情本來種姓差別，不由無漏種子有無。但依有障，無障建立。如瑜伽說，於真如境，若有畢竟二障種者，立為不般涅槃法性。若有畢竟所知障種非煩惱者，一分立為聲聞種性，一分立為獨覺種性。若無畢竟二障種者，即立彼為如來種性。故知本來種性差別依障建立，非無漏種。所說成就無漏種言。依當可生，非已有體。(T no. 1585, 31: 2.8b6–23)

3.1.2. *Vivṛtaguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā*:

Here, I have broken this long passage into shorter portions. The original Tibetan text follows my English translation of each portion.

Other [Yogācāras] see that imprints (i.e., residue of fragrance) in sesame [oil], etc., depend on infusion, and they acknowledge the generation of previously non-existent [imprints] through infusion

Pek. *ba'i*.

Pek. *zbin*.

D. adds *la*.

Yuqieshi di lun, T no. 1579, 30: 52.589a21–28: 答：由有障無障差別故，若於通達真如所緣中，有畢竟障種子者，建立為不般涅槃法種性補特伽羅。若不爾者，建立為般涅槃法種性補特伽羅。若有畢竟所知障種子布在所依，非煩惱障子者，於彼一分建立聲聞種性補特伽羅，一分建立獨覺種性補特伽羅。若不爾者，建立如來種性補特伽羅，是故無過。

⁴⁵ See n. 18.

⁴⁶ Cf. Sangpo and Chödrön, trans., *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*, 229–33.

and fostering of [imprints] that were previously generated through infusion. They also think that since the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) that cognizes the [six] inner *āyatana*s is also similar to *ālayavijñāna* subsumed in these [six inner *āyatana*s, because it is] a cognitive object [of mental consciousness], [the mental consciousness] generates imprints as generative causes that give rise to *ālayavijñāna*.

gzhan dag ni til la sogs pa la bag chags sgo bar byed pa la bltos pa⁴⁷
 mthong nas sgo bar byed pas sngon med pa skyed pa⁴⁸ dang / sgo bar
 byed pas sngon bskyed pa yongs su gso bar yang 'dod de nang gi skye
 mched la dmigs pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa de'i khongs su gtogs
 pa kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa la yang dmigs par 'dra bas kun gzhi'i
 rnam par shes pa bskyed par bya ba la bag chags rgyu'i rkyen du gyur
 pa skyed par yang sems so // (D. Ri 328b3–4; Pek. Li 394b1–4)

Furthermore, they say: “The *gotra* of the noble paths does not have the nature of the undefiled path either. Rather (as explained in the *tathatālanbanapratyayabīja* section of *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*), because the seeds of the hindrance of defilements and of the hindrance to the knowable (*nyon mongs pa dang shes bya'i sgrub pa, kleśajñeyāvarāna*) are attenuated in some people's [mental] continuities, they can be eliminated. These people have bodhisattva-*gotra*. People who have the seeds of the hindrance of defilements⁴⁹ [in their mental continuities] have *śrāvaka*- and *pratyekabuddha*-*gotras*. People who have [in their mental continuities] the seeds of both hindrances that cannot be eliminated because they are powerful have no *gotra*.^{49a} The first moment of the noble path has no generative cause, because the [doctrine of] the ‘four conditions’ is a provisional teaching (and thus all four are not necessarily required for something to arise).⁵⁰

⁴⁷ D. *ltos pas*.

⁴⁸ D. *skye ba*.

⁴⁹ This must be a copyist's error for ‘the hindrance to the knowable’.

^{49a} For this quotation, see n. 44.

⁵⁰ This portion corresponds to Brunnhölzl, *A Compendium of the Mahāyāna*, 872.

'phags pa'i lam gyi rigs kyang zag pa med pa'i lam gyi bdag nyid ma yin gyi / 'on kyang rgyud gang la nyon mongs pa dang⁵¹ shes bya'i sgrib pa'i sa bon srab pa'i phyir spang du rung⁵² ba de ni byan chub sems dpa'i rigs yin la / gang la nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa'i sa bon yod pa de ni⁵³ nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas kyi rigs yin / gang la gnyi ga'i sa bon che ba'i phyir spang du mi rung ba yod pa de ni rigs med pa yin no // 'phags pa'i lam gyi skad cig ma dang po la ni rgyu'i rkyen med do // rkyen bzhi⁵⁴ zhes bya ba ni ji ltar srid par gsungs pa'i phyir ro zhes zer ro // (D. Ri 328b4–6; Pek. Li 394b4–6)

3.2. Comparative Tables

Again, I compare the two texts following the sequence in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā*.

TABLE 5 Second Theory: Newly Deposited Seeds, Thesis

<i>Vivṛtaguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā</i>	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
<p>Other [Yogācāras] see that <u>imprints [of fragrance] in sesame [oil], etc., depend on infusion</u>, and they acknowledge the <u>generation</u> of previously non-existent [imprints] through infusion and fostering of [imprints] that were previously generated through infusion.</p> <p><i>gzhan dag ni til la sogs pa la bag chags sgo bar byed pa la bltos pa mthong nas sgo bar byed pas sngon med pa skyed pa dang / sgo bar byed pas sngon bskyed pa yongs su gso bar yang 'dod de</i></p>	<p>Other [Yogācāras] maintain that <u>all seeds are generated as a result of infusion</u>. The infuser and the infused both have existed from time immemorial. Therefore, seeds have been established from time immemorial. 'Seed' is another appellation for 'imprint', and imprints always await infusion (lit. scenting), just like the <u>fragrance in sesame [oil] that is generated because it has been scented by flowers</u>.</p> <p>有義種子，皆熏故生。所熏能熏，俱無始有。故諸種子，無始成就。種子既是習氣異名，習氣必由熏習而有。如麻香氣花熏故生。</p>

⁵¹ Pek. adds /.

⁵² Pek. *rang*.

⁵³ D. *nyid*.

⁵⁴ D., Pek. *gzhi*, but in this context it should be *bzhi*.

To prove the second theory (newly deposited imprints), the second theory in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* quoted in Table 5 maintains: Residue (imprints) of fragrance in sesame (oil), etc., presupposes infusion. In other words, before infusion, there is no imprint. The second theory in *Cheng weishi lun* states: ‘all seeds are generated as a result of infusion ... just like the fragrance in sesame [oil] that is generated because it has been scented by flowers’. On this point, the two commentaries agree completely.⁵⁵

TABLE 6 Second Theory: Mental Consciousness Depositing the Seeds of *Ālayavijñāna*

<i>Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā</i>	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
<p>They also think that since the <u>mental consciousness</u> (<i>manovijñāna</i>) that cognizes the [six] inner <i>āyatana</i>s is also similar to <i>ālayavijñāna</i> subsumed in these [six inner <i>āyatana</i>s, because it is] a cognitive object [of mental consciousness], <u>[the mental consciousness] generates imprints as generative causes that give rise to <i>ālayavijñāna</i>.</u></p> <p><i>nang gi skye mched la dmigs pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa de'i khongs su gtogs pa kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa la yang dmigs par 'dra bas kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa bskyed par bya ba la bag chags rgyu'i rkyen du gyur pa skyed par yang sems so //</i></p>	<p>(Elsewhere: <i>Cheng weishi lun shuji</i>) Regarding the portion of the treatise (<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>) from ‘only the seven [types of] active consciousness (<i>zhuanshi</i> 轉識, <i>pravṛttivijñāna</i>)’ to ‘can be the infuser’, the commentary (<i>shuji</i>) says: This is the conclusion. Namely, from among the cognizing subjects, the seven [types of] active consciousness and their mental functions are the infusers. If [one asks:] ‘What is struck by the image portion?’ (I.e., what is the cognitive object of the image portion?), [the answer] is that, because the <u>eight</u> [type of] <u>consciousness</u> is a cognitive object of the <u>sixth</u> and <u>seventh</u> [types of] <u>consciousness</u>, the <u>image portions</u> [of the two types of consciousness] <u>infuse</u> [the seeds of <i>ālayavijñāna</i>].</p> <p>(《成唯識論述記》)論：唯七轉識，至可是能熏。述曰：總結也。即能緣中七轉識、心所等為能熏。若為相分，何法為障？即第八</p>

⁵⁵ ‘Other [Yogācāras] ... acknowledge ... fostering of [imprints] that were previously generated through infusion’ in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* has no direct counterpart in the corresponding portion of *Cheng weishi lun*. Nevertheless, fostering existing imprints is not at odds with the point of view of the second theory of *Cheng weishi lun*.

識為六、七識之所緣，故為相分熏。(T no. 1830, 43: 3.314c12–15)
 (Elsewhere) The eighth consciousness can be the cognitive object of the first seven [types of] consciousness, because they can infuse the seeds of the image and cognizing portions of that [ālayavijñāna].
 前七於八，所緣容有，能熏成彼相見種故。(T no. 1585, 31: 8.42c17–18)
 (Elsewhere: *Shuji*) If the sixth [type of] consciousness cognizes the image and cognizing portions of the eighth [type of] consciousness, it infuses their seeds. Namely, it infuses the seeds of both portions [of ālayavijñāna].
 (《成唯識論述記》) 第六識若緣第八見·相而熏種，即雙熏彼二分種子。(T no. 1830, 43: 8.512c27–28)

To prove the second theory (newly deposited imprints), the *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* offers two arguments. Table 6 shows the first one: As the first theory (preexisting imprints) maintains, there is no second *ālayavijñāna* that can infuse the imprint of *ālayavijñāna*. Nevertheless, since the mental consciousness cognizes *ālayavijñāna*, the mental consciousness and *ālayavijñāna* as its cognitive object are similar. Since it is a general principle that an infuser and the infused imprint or seed must be homogeneous,⁵⁶ the imprint of *ālayavijñāna* can be infused by mental consciousness.

While there is no direct counterpart within the corresponding portion of *Cheng weishi lun*, in terms of content, the idea expressed in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* closely resembles the doctrine of the Faxiang School, as stated in *Cheng weishi lun shuji*, of ‘infusing imprints by way of the image portion [of consciousness]’ (*xiang-fenxun* 相分熏).

⁵⁶ See n. 37.

TABLE 7 Second Theory: Depositing the Seeds of Undefined Wisdom

<i>Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā</i>	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
<p>Furthermore, they say: ‘The <u>gotra</u> of the noble paths does not have the nature of the undefiled path either. Rather (as explained in the <i>tathatālanambanapratyayabīja</i> section of <i>Viniścayasamgrahaṇī</i>), because the seeds of the hindrance of defilements and of the hindrance to the knowable are attenuated in some people’s [mental] continuities, they can be eliminated. These people have bodhisattva-<i>gotra</i>. People who have the seeds of the hindrance of defilements⁵⁷ [in their mental continuities] have <i>śrāvaka-</i> and <i>pratyekabuddha-gotras</i>. People who have [in their mental continuities] the seeds of both hindrances that cannot be eliminated because they are powerful have no <i>gotra</i>. The first moment of the noble path has no generative cause, because the [doctrine of] the ‘four conditions’ is a provisional teaching (and thus all four are not necessarily required for something to arise)’.</p> <p><i>’phags pa’i lam gyi rigs kyang zag pa med pa’i lam gyi bdag nyid ma yin gyi / ’on kyang rgyud gang la nyon mongs pa dang shes bya’i sgrib pa’i sa bon sgrab pa’i phyir spang du rung ba de ni byan chub sems dpa’i rigs yin la / gang la nyon mongs pa’i sgrib pa’i sa bon yod pa de ni nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas kyi rigs yin / gang la gnyi ga’i sa bon che ba’i phyir spang du mi rung ba yod pa de ni rigs med pa yin no / ’phags pa’i lam gyi skad cig ma dang po la ni rgyu’i rkyen med do /</i></p>	<p>Undefiled seeds are also generated through infusion. It is stated [in <i>Mahāyānasamgraha</i>] that the ‘imprints of hearing’ are infused and generated through hearing the true Dharma, which is a homogeneous outflow from the purest Dharmadhātu. These are the seeds of supramundane mind. The original <i>gotra</i> distinctions among sentient beings are not [determined] by the presence or absence of undefiled seeds. These [distinctions] are established due to the presence or absence of hindrances. As [the <i>Viniścayasamgrahaṇī</i> (The Collection of Doctrinal Exegeses) section of] <i>Yogā[cārabhūmi]</i>⁵⁸ states: If [beings] have seeds of the two [kinds of] ultimate hindrances to <i>tathatā</i> as object, they are not destined for nirvāṇa. If [beings] have seeds of ultimate hindrance to the knowable but do not have [seeds of the hindrance of] defilements, some of them are called [those who have] <i>śrāvaka-gotra</i>, while the others are called [those who have] <i>pratyekabuddha-gotra</i>. If [beings] have no seed of either [kind of] ultimate hindrance to <i>tathatā</i> as object, they are called [those who have] <i>tathāgata-gotra</i>. Therefore, it is known that the original <i>gotra</i> distinctions are determined based on the hindrances and not on undefiled seeds. The statement [in <i>Yogācārabhūmi</i>]: ‘[Hell beings] are endowed with undefiled seeds’, refers to seeds that can arise in the future and not to those that already exist. 無漏種生，亦由熏習。說聞熏習，聞淨法界等流正法，而熏起故，是出世心種子性故。有情本來種姓差別。不由無漏種子有無。但</p>

⁵⁷ As pointed out above (n. 49), this must be a copyist’s error for ‘the hindrance to the knowable’.

⁵⁸ See n. 44.

依有障，無障建立。如《瑜伽》(《攝決擇分》真如所緣緣種子段)說，於真如境，若有畢竟二障種者，立為不般涅槃法性。若有畢竟所知障種非煩惱者，一分立為聲聞種性，一分立為獨覺種性。若無畢竟二障種者，即立彼為如來種性。故知本來種性差別依障建立非無漏種，所說成就無漏種言，依當可生，非已有體。

(Elsewhere: The third theory) If only newly generated seeds existed, conditioned but undefiled [dharmas] (i.e., undefiled wisdom) could not arise because they have no generative cause. Defiled [seeds] cannot be the seeds of undefiled [dharmas]. [If that were the case,] undefiled seeds would give rise to defiled [dharmas]. If we accept that, defiled [dharmas] would arise again to Buddhas, and good [seeds], etc., would be the seeds of evil [dharmas], etc.
(本有、新熏合生義) 若唯始起，有為無漏，無因緣故，應不得生。有漏不應為無漏種，勿無漏種生有漏故。許應諸佛有漏復生，善等應為不善等種。(T no. 1585, 31: 2.8c15–18)

The second argument in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* quoted in Table 7 is that the generative cause of the noble paths is not pre-existing undefiled seeds (tantamount to *gotra*), either. According to the discussion of *tathatālabhanapratyayabīja* (Ch. *zhenru suoyuan-yuan zhongzi* 真如所緣緣種子)⁵⁹ in *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* section of *Yogācārabhūmi*, even the Yogācāra School's traditional theory of *gotra* distinctions (i.e., the spiritual predisposition predetermined by the primordial undefiled seeds [i.e., *gotra*] in the *ālayavijñāna*) is explained away by the presence or absence of the hindrance of defilements (*kleśāvaraṇa*, Ch. *fannao zhang* 煩惱障) and the hindrance to the knowable (*jñeyāvaraṇa*, Ch. *suozhi zhang* 所知障). Here, if

⁵⁹ For the significance of this portion, see Yamabe, 'Shinnyo shoennen shūji'.

the *klesāvaraṇa* in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* is indeed a copyist's error for *jñeyāvaraṇa* (see n. 49), then the views expressed in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* and *Cheng weishi lun* match perfectly.

The 'noble paths' of *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* also correspond to the idea of 'conditioned but undefiled [dharmas]' (*youwei wulou* 有爲無漏, *anāsravasamskṛta*) found in the third theory of *Cheng weishi lun*, since both the noble paths and conditioned, undefiled dharmas are equivalent to undefiled wisdom. Therefore, the discussions in the two texts convey the same idea.

4. Third Theory: Seeds are Primordial and Newly Deposited

4.1. Translations

4.1.1. *Cheng weishi lun*:

Yet other [Yogācāras] maintain that there are two types of each seed. One type is primordial. Namely, it is the distinct capacity, which exists naturally in the karmic retribution consciousness (*yishoushi* 異熟識, *vipākavijñāna*, i.e., *ālayavijñāna*) from time immemorial, to generate *skandhas*, *āyatanas*, and *dhātus*. Referring to [this kind of seed], the Blessed One said [in a *sūtra*]: 'From time immemorial, all sentient beings have various kinds of *dhātus*. They exist naturally like a heap of nuts of *akṣa* (*echa* 惡叉, 'myrobalan').⁶⁰ Other scriptural testimonies are as quoted before. These [seeds] are called seeds that are present by nature (*benxingzhu* 本性住, *prakṛtistha*).⁶¹

有義種子, 各有二類. 一者本有, 謂無始來, 異熟識中, 法爾而有, 生蘊處界, 功能差別. 世尊依此, 說諸有情, 無始時來, 有種種界, 如惡叉聚, 法爾而有. 餘所引證, 廣說如初. 此即名爲 '本性住種'. (T no. 1585, 31: 2.8b23–28)

The other [type] is newly generated. Namely, [these seeds] exist

⁶⁰ See n. 13.

⁶¹ See n. 19.

having been infused again and again since time immemorial by active [dharmas]. Referring to them, the Blessed One stated [in a *sūtra*]: ‘Because the minds of sentient beings are infused by defiled and pure dharmas, boundless seeds are accumulated therein.’ Various treatises also say that defiled and pure seeds are generated due to having been infused by defiled and pure dharmas. They are called enhanced (*xi-suo*cheng 習所成, *samudānīta*) seeds.⁶²

二者始起，謂無始來，數數現行熏習而有。世尊依此，說有情心，染淨諸法，所熏習故，無量種子之所積集。諸論亦說，染淨種子，由染淨法，熏習故生。此即名爲‘習所成種’。(T no. 1585, 31: 2.8b28–c3)

If [seeds] were only primordial, active [types of] consciousness would not be a generative cause for *ālayavijñāna*, as is said in [*Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra*]:

Dharmas adhere to the consciousness, and, similarly, consciousness to dharmas.

They are always each other’s result and cause.⁶³

The message of this verse is as follows: *Ālayavijñāna* and the active [types of] consciousness always generate and mutually cause each other. *Mahāyānasamgraha* says: ‘*Ālayavijñāna* and defiled dharmas are the generative cause of each other. It is just like a wick that generates a flame and a flame that burns the wick. It is also like bundles of reeds that support one another. Only with regard to these two is generative cause established, because it cannot be found elsewhere’.⁶⁴

⁶² tatra samudānītaṃ goṭraṃ yat pūrvakuśalamūlābhyāsāt pratilabdham / (Wogihara, ed., *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, 3.4–6)

Yujiashi di lun pusa di 瑜伽師地論菩薩地, T no. 1579, 30:478c15–17: 習所成種姓者，謂先串習善根所得，是名習所成種姓。

⁶³ See n. 14.

⁶⁴ kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang / kun nas nyon mongs pa’i chos de dag dus mnyam du gcig gi rgyu nyid du gcig ’gyur bar ji ltar blta zhe na / dper na mar me’i me lce ’byung ba dang / snying po tshig pa phan tshun dus mnyam pa dang / mdung khyim yang dus mnyam du gcig la gcig brten nas mi ’gyel ba# bzhin du ’dir yang gcig gi rgyu nyid du gcig ’gyur bar blta’o // ji ltar kun gzhi rnam par

If seeds are generated without infusion, how can active [types of] consciousness be the generative cause for *ālayavijñāna*? [Something that merely] fosters [something else] through infusion cannot be called a generative cause. [If it could,] good and bad karmas would be the generative cause for the resulting karmic retribution (*vipākaphala*).⁶⁵ Also, various scriptural passages say: ‘Seeds are generated through infusion’. All this goes against their argument. Therefore, [arguing that there are] only primordial seeds contradicts reason and scriptures.

若唯本有，轉識不應與阿賴耶爲因緣性，如契經說：

諸法於識藏 識於法亦爾。

更互爲果性 亦常爲因性。

此頌意言，阿賴耶識，與諸轉識，於一切時，展轉相生，互爲因果。《攝大乘》說，阿賴耶識，與雜染法，互爲因緣。如炷與焰展轉生燒。

shes pa kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos rnam kyī rgyu yin pa de ltar kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos rnam kyang kun gzhi ##rnam par shes pa'i rgyu'i rkyen du### rnam par bzhag ste / rgyu'i rkyen gzhan mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro // (Nagao, ed., *Mahāyānasamgraha*, §I.17, 24).

D. adds *de*.

##—### Lamotte reads: *rnam par shes pa'i rgyu <yin pa'o> / de ltar rgyu'i rkyen* following *Upanibandhana*. D. *rkyen nyid du* replaces *rkyen du*.

She dashenglun ben, T no. 1594, 31: 1.134c15–20: 復次，阿賴耶識與彼雜染諸法，同時更互爲因。云何可見？譬如明燈，焰炷生燒，同時更互。又如蘆束，互相依持，同時不倒。應觀此中，更互爲因，道理亦爾。如阿賴耶識，爲雜染諸法因。雜染諸法，亦爲阿賴耶識因。唯就如是安立因緣。所餘因緣，不可得故。

⁶⁵ From the point of view of *Cheng weishi lun*, karmas are ‘supporting condition’ (*adhipatipratyaya*) for their retribution (*vipāka*). See also the following passage from *Mahāyānasamgraha*:

gal te rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba dang po la rnam par shes pa de dag phan tshun du rgyu'i rkyen yin na / 'o na rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba gnyis pa la gang gi rkyen ces bya zhe na / bdag po'i rkyen to // (Nagao ed., *Mahāyānasamgraha* §I.28, 31–32)

She dashenglun ben, T no. 1594, 31: 1.135b17–18: 若於第一緣起中，如是二識互爲因緣，於第二緣起中，復是何緣？是增上緣。

又如束蘆互相依住。唯依此二，建立因緣。所餘因緣，不可得故。若諸種子，不由熏生，如何轉識，與阿賴耶，有因緣義。非熏令長，可名因緣。勿善惡業，與異熟果，為因緣故。又諸聖教，說有種子，由熏習生，皆違彼義。故唯本有，理教相違。(T no. 1585, 31: 2.8c3–15)

If [seeds] were only newly generated, conditioned but undefiled [dharmas] (*youwei wulou* 有為無漏, *anāsravasamskṛta*, i.e., undefiled wisdom [*anāsravajñāna*]) could not arise because they would have no generative cause. Defiled [seeds] cannot be the seeds of undefiled [dharmas]. [If they could,] undefiled seeds would give rise to defiled [dharmas]. Admitting that, defiled [dharmas] would arise again to Buddhas, and good [seeds], etc., would be the seeds of evil [dharmas], etc.

若唯始起，有為無漏，無因緣故，應不得生。有漏不應為無漏種，勿無漏種生有漏故。許應諸佛，有漏復生。善等應為不善等種。……(T no. 1585, 31: 2.8c15–18)

The real intention of the statement [in *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*] that the *gotra* distinctions are established by means of the hindrances⁶⁶ is to demonstrate the presence or absence of undefiled seeds. Namely, if [people] completely lack undefiled seeds, they can never eliminate the seeds of the two [kinds of] hindrances. They are defined as not being destined for *nirvāṇa*. If [people] have only the undefiled seeds of the two vehicles, they can never eliminate the seeds of the hindrance to the knowable. Some [of these people] are defined as having *śrāvaka-gotra*, while the others are defined as having *pratyekabuddha-gotra*. If [people] further have the undefiled seeds of Buddhas, they can ultimately eliminate these two [kinds of] hindrances. They are defined as having *tathāgata-gotra*. Therefore, due to the presence or absence of undefiled seeds, the hindrances can or cannot be eliminated. Nevertheless, undefiled seeds are subtle, hidden, and hard to know. Therefore, the *gotra* distinctions are revealed by these distinctions of hindrances. Otherwise, what differences are there

⁶⁶ See n. 44.

among these hindrances that would make them subject to elimination or not? If [the proponents of this theory] say that there naturally are these distinctions of hindrances, how do they not accept the same [argument] regarding undefiled seeds? If originally there were absolutely no undefiled seed, the noble paths could never arise. Who could eliminate the seeds of the two [kinds of] hindrances, and how could one say that the *gotra* distinctions are established by means of the hindrances? Since the noble paths would never [be able to] arise, arguing that they could arise in the future definitely does not make sense. Moreover, various scriptural passages concerning the existence of primordial seeds all contradict this argument. Therefore, the theory that only admits newly generated [seeds] contradicts reason and scriptures. Accordingly, one should know that each of the seeds of various dharmas is twofold: primordial and newly generated.⁶⁷

依障建立種性別者，意顯無漏種子有無。謂若全無無漏種者，彼二障種，永不可害。即立彼為非涅槃法。若唯有二乘無漏種者，彼所知障種，永不可害。一分立為聲聞種姓，一分立為獨覺種姓。若亦有佛無漏種者，彼二障種，俱可永害。即立彼為如來種姓。故由無漏種子有無障有可斷不可斷義，然無漏種微隱難知，故約彼障顯性差別。不爾彼障，有何別因，而有可害不可害者，若謂法爾，有此障別，無漏法種，寧不許然？若本全無無漏法種，則諸聖道，永不得生。誰當能害二障種子，而說依障，立種性別。既彼聖道，必無生義，說當可生，亦定非理。然諸聖教，處處說有，本有種子，皆違彼義。故唯始起，理教相違。由此應知，諸法種子，各有本有，始起二類。(T no. 1585, 31: 2.9a21–b7)

4.1.2. *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā*:

Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā also acknowledges that there are two kinds of seeds.

Still other [Yogācaras] say that imprints are [both] present naturally, to be fostered, and previously absent, to be [newly] generated. Many

⁶⁷ I have referred to Sangpo and Chödrön, trans., *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*, 243–45.

generated imprints are, by way of being cooperative causes (*lhan cig byed pa'i rgyu, sahabākāribetu*), supporting conditions (*bdag po'i rkyen, adhipatipratyaya*) for the natural imprints (*chos nyid bag chags, *dharmatāvāsanā*). They think that the natural imprints and the many generated imprints that did not exist before are, like the homogeneous cause (*skal pa mnyam ba'i rgyu, sabhāgabetu*) imputed by Vaibhāṣikas, the generative cause for giving rise to a result of one moment.⁶⁸

gzhan dag na re bag chags ni chos nyid kyis⁶⁹ gnas pa yongs su gso bya ba⁷⁰ dang / sngon med pa bskyed par bya ba yang yin te / bskyed pa'i bag chags du ma ni lhan cig byed pa'i rgyu nyid kyis⁷¹ chos nyid bag chags kyi bdag po'i rkyen yin la / chos nyid kyi bag chags gang yin pa dang / sngon med pa bskyed⁷² pa'i bag chags du ma yang bye brag tu smra ba brtags pa skal pa mnyam ba'i rgyu bzhin du skad cig ma gcig pa'i 'bras bu skye ba'i yang rgyu'i rkyen nyid du sems so // (Derge Ri 328b6–329a1; Pek. Li 394b6–395a1)

Now, the first theory is to be criticized. [According to this position,] because desire, etc., only foster [pre-existing imprints], they are not established as generative causes.⁷³ [What fosters another dharma is only a supporting condition.] For example, in the phrase [within the dependent origination formula], 'consciousness (*rnam par shes pa, vijñāna*) is conditioned by mental formations (*'du byed, saṃskāra*)', because mental formations foster the seed of consciousness, [mental formations] are [considered to be] supporting conditions [for the seeds of consciousness]. [In *Mahāyānasamgraha* §I.28, it is said:]

⁶⁸ I understand this means that a single dharma is generated by both natural and generated imprints. This paragraph corresponds to Brunnhölzl, *A Compendium of the Mahāyāna*, 872–73.

⁶⁹ Pek. *kyi*.

⁷⁰ Pek. omits *ba*.

⁷¹ D. *kyi*.

⁷² D. adds *ba*.

⁷³ See n. 21.

‘Then, in the second [type of] dependent origination (i.e., the dependent origination of the twelve links), which condition is referred to? It refers to supporting condition’.⁷⁴ Therefore, [according to the first theory, there can be only supporting conditions between active dharmas and *ālayavijñāna*, but this] contradicts [another statement in *Mahāvāyānasamgraha* §I.17:] ‘Like *ālayavijñāna*, defiled dharmas also are generative causes’.⁷⁵

de la rnam par rtog pa dang po la gleng bar bya ste / 'dod chags la sogs pa ni yons su gso ba tsam du nye bar gnas pa'i phyir rgyu'i rkyen du mi 'grub ste / dper na 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba 'di la 'du byed rnam par shes pa'i sa bon yongs⁷⁶ su gso bar byed pa yin pa'i phyir bdag po'i rkyen nyid yin pa lta bu'o // 'o na rten cing 'brel bar⁷⁷ 'byun ba gnyis pa la gang gi rkyen zhes⁷⁸ bya zhe na / bdag po'i rkyen to⁷⁹ zhes 'byung ba'i yang phyir te / des na kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa ji lta ba de bzhin du kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos rnams kyang rgyu'i rkyen yin no zhes bya ba 'di 'gal lo // (Derge Ri 329a1–3; Pek. Li 395a1–4)

[Proponents of the first theory may counter:] That is not the case. [Desire, etc.], by fostering homogeneous seeds (i.e., seeds corresponding to respective dharmas), are generative causes [of seeds]. For example, something is, [according to] the *Vaibhāṣikas*, a homogenous cause of something else due to their homogeneity. [A dharma is called] a supporting condition because it fosters a heterogeneous imprint.⁸⁰

de ni ma yin te / rigs mthun pa'i sa bon yongs su gsos pas rgyu'i rkyen nyid yin te / dper na bye brag tu smra ba'i skal pa mnyam pa'i rgyu

⁷⁴ See n. 65.

⁷⁵ See n. 64. Brunnhölzl, *A Compendium of the Mahāvāyāna*, 873.

⁷⁶ Pek. *yong*.

⁷⁷ D. *par*.

⁷⁸ Pek. *ces*.

⁷⁹ *Sic* D., Pek.

⁸⁰ Brunnhölzl, *A Compendium of the Mahāvāyāna*, 873.

rdzas gzhan nyid skal pa mnyam pa'i phyir rdzas gzhan gyi yin pa lta bu'o // bdag po'i rkyen ni mi 'dra ba'i bag chags yongs su gsos pa'i phyir yin no // (Derge Ri 329a3–4; Pek. Li 395a4–5)

Also, if [proponents of the second theory] ask, 'Since nothing similar (i.e., imprints of fragrance without infusion) can be found in sesame [oil], etc., how can imprints exist naturally (before being infused)?',⁸¹ it is not reasonable. Even when garlic, stones, etc., come together with flowers, it is observed that the fragrance of these [flowers] is not retained. Therefore, we know that it is precisely due to their nature that sesame [oil], etc., are capable of retaining the fragrance [of flowers]. Furthermore, since nothing is real apart from mind and mental functions, sesame [oil], etc., definitely do not exist. Since it is accepted in worldly consensus that [sesame oil, etc., are] the basis for the residue [or 'imprint' of fragrance], how could it follow that they are [really] like those [imprints] if they are simply taken as mere similes for the arising of imprints, etc.?⁸²

'on te til la sogs pa la de lta bu ma mthong pa'i⁸³ phyir ji ltar chos nyid kyi⁸⁴ gnas pa'i bag chags su 'gyur zhe na / de ni rigs pa ma yin te / sgog skya dang⁸⁵ rdo la sogs pa la me tog dang phrad kyang de'i dri mi 'dzin pa snang ba'i phyir til la sogs pa la chos nyid kho nas dri 'dzin pa'i nus pa yod do zhes bya bar shes so // gzhan yang sems dang sems las byung ba la⁸⁶ ma gtogs pa'i dngos po med pa'i phyir til la sogs pa ni med pa kho na'i / 'jig rten gyi grags par bag chags kyi rten nyid du grags pas bag chags 'byung ba la sogs pa'i dpe tsam du byas pa 'ba' zhig tu zad na⁸⁷ ji ltar de dang 'dra bar thal bar 'gyur / (Derge Ri 329a4–7; Pek. Li 395a5–8)

⁸¹ Cf. n. 40.

⁸² Brunnhölzl, *A Compendium of the Mahāyāna*, 873.

⁸³ Pek. *ba'i*.

⁸⁴ D. *kyi*.

⁸⁵ D. *sgos skya'i*.

⁸⁶ D. *las*.

⁸⁷ Pek. omits *na*.

Some criticize the second theory [as follows]: ‘Since *ālayavijñāna* does not arise and perish simultaneously with another *ālayavijñāna*, there cannot be a imprint that causes the arising of the [*ālayavijñāna*]’.⁸⁸ If [proponents of the second theory object, saying], ‘Did we not say that the mental consciousness that is similar to [*ālayavijñāna* as its] cognitive object generates the imprint [of *ālayavijñāna*]?’⁸⁹ it is not reasonable.⁹⁰

rnam par rtog pa gnyis pa la yang kha cig gleng ba / kun gzhi'i rnam
par shes pa ni kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa gzhan dang lhan cig skye ba
dang 'gag pa med pa'i phyir de skye ba'i rgyu mtshan gyi bag chags su
mi 'gyur ro zhe'o // dmigs pa 'dra ba'i yid kyi rnam par shes pas bag
chags bskyed do zhes bshad pa ma yin nam zhe na / de ni rigs pa ma
yin te / (Derge Ri 329a7–b1; Pek. Li 395a8–b2)

Cognitive objects are twofold: substantial [dharmas] that have the nature of mind and mental functions and insubstantial [dharmas] that have the nature of matter. Of these, the mental consciousness that cognizes minds and mental functions generates the imprints of only these [mind and mental functions], while the [mental consciousness] that cognizes matter generates imprints that give rise only to these [material dharmas]. Since neither of them can be established as cognitive objects (*ālambana*) or modes of cognition (*ākāra*) by the theory of mind-only, how can [*ālayavijñāna*] be similar to [mental consciousness] as its cognitive object?⁹¹

⁸⁸ Cf. n. 21. This sentence is a little difficult to understand. A literal translation of the original *de skye ba'i rgyu mtshan gyi bag chags su mi 'gyur ro* would be something like: ‘[The *ālayavijñāna*] would not become an imprint that causes the [*ālayavijñāna* itself]’. This may be possible, since *vāsanā* and *ālayavijñāna* are not separable. However, if we assume that the underlying Sanskrit was something like: **tannimittavāsanā na syāt*, ‘there cannot be an imprint that causes the arising of the [*ālayavijñāna*]’ might be another possible interpretation. For the time being, I would like to follow this interpretation.

⁸⁹ See Table 6 and its discussion.

⁹⁰ Brunnhölzl, *A Compendium of the Mahāyāna*, 873–74.

⁹¹ Brunnhölzl, *A Compendium of the Mahāyāna*, 874.

dmigs pa ni rnam pa gnyis te / sems dang sems las byung ba'i ngo
 bo nyid rdzas dang / gzugs kyi bdag nyid rdzas su med pa'o // de la
 sems dang sems las byung ba la dmigs pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa
 gang yin pa des ni / de dag kho na bskyed par bya ba'i phyir bag chags
 skyed la / gzugs la dmigs pa gang yin pa des⁹² de kho na bskyed par
 bya ba'i phyir ro // sems tsam nyid kyi lugs kyis ni gnyi ga ltar yang
 dmigs pa dang⁹³ rnam pa ma grub pa'i phyir ji ltar na dmigs pa'i sgo
 nas 'dra bar 'gyur / (Derge Ri 329b1–3; Pek. Li 395b2–5)

Alternatively, cognitive objects are also twofold in terms of direct and indirect cognitive objects. Of these, the direct cognitive object [of mental consciousness] is the apprehended aspect [of mental consciousness itself]. The indirect object is *ālayavijñāna* because, due to its power, the apprehended aspect [of mental consciousness] appears.⁹⁴

'on te mngon sum du dmigs pa dang brgyud pa'i sgo nas gzhan du
 rnam pa gnyis te / de la mngon sum gyi dmigs pa ni gzung pa'i⁹⁵
 rnam pa gang yin pa'o // brgyud pa'i dmigs pa ni kun gzhi'i rnam par
 shes pa ste / de'i dbang gis gzung⁹⁶ ba'i rnam par snang ba'i phyir ro
 // (Derge Ri 329b3–4; Pek. Li 395b5–6)

Therefore, if [you] think, 'Why is [the mental consciousness], which cognizes the substantially existent [*ālayavijñāna*] as an indirectly object?', this position also [has the following problem:] Due also to the power of minds and mental functions of other [people], mental consciousness apprehending the cognitive object and the cognizing mode arises. Therefore, since the imprints generated by that [mental consciousness] would be the generative causes of the

⁹² D. adds *kyang*.

⁹³ Pek. adds /.

⁹⁴ Brunnhölzl, *A Compendium of the Mahāyāna*, 874.

⁹⁵ Pek. *ba'i*.

⁹⁶ Pek. *bzung*.

minds and mental functions of other beings, it would follow that all sentient beings are reduced to [just] one mental continuity. Even if only [one's own] mental continuity is the cognitive object, [according to the mind-only theory mentioned above] neither the cognitive object nor the cognitive mode is established. Therefore, neither the cognitive object nor the cognitive mode is similar [to *ālayavijñāna*], [and] the seeds of that [*ālayavijñāna* can] exist [only naturally].⁹⁷

de bas na brgyud pa'i dmigs pa'i sgo nas rdzas su yod pa la dmigs pa ni ji ltar na dmigs pa'i sgo nas mi 'dra snyam du sems na / rtog pa 'di la yang gzhan gyi sems dang sems las byung ba'i dbang gis kyang yid kyi rnam par shes pa dmigs pa dang rnam pa yongs su 'dzin par skye ba'i⁹⁸ phyir / des bskyed pa'i⁹⁹ bag chags gzhan gyi sems dang sems las byung ba rnam kyi rgyu'i rkyen du 'gyur bas sems can thams cad rgyud gcig pa nyid du thal bar 'gyur ro // rgyud¹⁰⁰ de dmigs pa nyid yin na yang dmigs pa dang rnam pa yongs su ma grub pa'i phyir dmigs pa dang rnam pa mi 'dra ba de'i son¹⁰¹ 'dug go // (Derge Ri 329b4–6; Pek. Li 395b6–396a1)

Moreover, [the second theory] argues as follows: ‘The *gotra* [that is present] by nature [means that] the hindrance of defilements and the hindrance to the knowable are thin. The noble paths have no generative cause’.¹⁰² [This] is not reasonable either because the following [statement] appears in [*Bodhisattvabhūmi*]: ‘The *gotra* that is present by nature is the distinctive [state] of the six *āyatana*s’.¹⁰³ [This argument of the second theory is unreasonable] also because, according to all [Buddhist] schools, all minds and mental functions

⁹⁷ Brunnhölzl, *A Compendium of the Mahāyāna*, 874.

⁹⁸ D. *skyed pa'i*.

⁹⁹ Pek. *ba'i*.

¹⁰⁰ Pek. *rgyu*.

¹⁰¹ D., Pek., *so na* but this must be a copyist's error for *son* (i.e., *sa bon*).

¹⁰² See Table 7.

¹⁰³ See n. 19.

arise depending to the four conditions. [Therefore, we] can consider that [the mention of] ‘the attenuated seeds of hindrance’ found in *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* has the hidden intention of showing the existence of the undefiled natural seeds.¹⁰⁴

gang yang rang bzhin gyi rigs nyon mongs pa dang shes bya’i sgrib pa srab pa yin no // ’phags pa’i lam la rgyu’i rkyen med do¹⁰⁵ zhes smras pa gang yin pa de yang rigs pa ma yin te / rang bzhin du gnas pa’i rigs ni skye mched drug gi khyad par ro zhes ’byung ba’i phyir dang¹⁰⁶ / sde ba thams cad las kyang sems dang sems las byung ba thams cad rkyen bzhis skye bar ’byung ba’i phyir ro // rnam par gtan la dbab pa bsdu ba las ’byung ba ni sgrib pa’i sa bon srab pa nyid kyis¹⁰⁷ chos nyid kyi sa bon zag pa med pa yod pa nyid du bstan pa yin no zhes bya bar dgongs pa yongs su brtag par nus so // (Derge Ri 329b6–330a1; Pek. Li 396a1–4)

4.2. Comparative Tables

TABLE 8 Third Theory: Thesis

<i>Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā</i>	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
<p>Still other [Yogācāras] say that imprints are [both] <u>present naturally</u>, to be fostered, and previously absent, to be [<u>newly</u>] generated. Many generated imprints are, by way of being cooperative causes (<i>lhan cig byed pa’i rgyu</i>, <i>sabakāribetu</i>), supporting conditions (<i>bdag po’i rkyen</i>, <i>adhipatipratyaya</i>) for the natural imprints (<i>chos nyid bag chags</i>, *<i>dharmatāvāsanā</i>). They think that the natural imprints and the many generated imprints that did not exist before are, like the homogeneous cause (<i>skal pa mnyam</i></p>	<p>Yet other [Yogācāras] maintain that there are two types of each seed. One type is <u>primordial</u>. Namely, it is the distinct capacity, which exists naturally in the karmic retribution consciousness (<i>yishoushi</i> 異熟識, <i>vipākavijñāna</i>, i.e., <i>ālayavijñāna</i>) from time immemorial, to generate <i>skandhas</i>, <i>āyatanas</i>, and <i>dhātus</i>. Referring to [this kind of seed], the Blessed One said [in a <i>sūtra</i>]: ‘From time immemorial, all sentient beings have various kinds of <i>dhātus</i>. They exist naturally like a heap of nuts of <i>akṣa</i> (<i>echa</i></p>

¹⁰⁴ Brunnhölzl, *A Compendium of the Mahāyāna*, 874–75.

¹⁰⁵ Pek. adds //.

¹⁰⁶ See n. 19.

¹⁰⁷ D. *kyi*.

ba'i rgyu, sabhāgabetu) imputed by Vaibhāṣikas, the generative cause for giving rise to a result of one moment.
gzhan dag na re bag chags ni chos nyid kyis gnas pa yongs su gso bya ba dang / sngon med pa bskyed par bya ba yang yin te / bskyed pa'i bag chags du ma ni lhan cig byed pa'i rgyu nyid kyis chos nyid bag chags kyi bdag po'i rkyen yin la / chos nyid kyi bag chags gang yin pa dang / sngon med pa bskyed pa'i bag chags du ma yang bye brag tu smra ba brtags pa skal pa mnyam ba'i rgyu bzhin du skad cig ma gcig pa'i 'bras bu skye ba'i yang rgyu'i rkyen nyid du sems so //

惡叉, 'myrobalan'). Other scriptural testimonies are as quoted before. These [seeds] are called seeds that are present by nature (*benxingzhu* 本性住, *praktistha*). The other [type] is newly generated. Namely, [these seeds] exist having been infused again and again since time immemorial by active [dharmas] and exist. Referring to them, the Blessed One stated [in a *sūtra*]: 'Because the minds of sentient beings are infused by defiled and pure dharmas, boundless seeds are accumulated therein'. Various treatises also say that defiled and pure seeds are generated due to having been infused by defiled and pure dharmas. They are called enhanced (*xisuocheng* 習所成, *samudānīta*) seeds.

有義種子，各有二類。一者本有，謂無始來，異熟識中，法爾而有，生蘊處界，功能差別。世尊依此，說諸有情，無始時來，有種種界，如惡叉聚，法爾而有。餘所引證，廣說如初。此即名為本性住種。二者始起，謂無始來，數數現行，熏習而有。世尊依此，說有情心，染淨諸法，所熏習故，無量種子之所積集，諸論亦說，染淨種子，由染淨法，熏習故生，此即名為習所成種。

The naturally existent imprints in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā* in Table 8 correspond to the primordial seeds in *Cheng weishi lun*. The imprints that 'were previously absent and are to be [newly] generated' in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā* correspond to the seeds that are 'newly generated' (*shiqi* 始起, i.e., newly infused 新熏). Thus, the basic arguments in the passages quoted from both texts agree.

TABLE 9 Third Theory: Critique of the First Theory (Fostering Imprints and Generative Cause)

<i>Vivṛtaguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā</i>	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
Now, the first theory is to be criticized. [According to this position,] because desire, etc., <u>only foster</u> [pre-existing imprints], <u>they are not established</u>	If [seeds] were only primordial, active [types of] consciousness <u>would not be a generative cause for <i>ālayavijñāna</i></u> , as is said in [<i>Mahāyānābhīdharma</i>] <i>sūtra</i> :

as generative causes. [What fosters another dharma is only a supporting condition.] For example, in the phrase [within the dependent origination formula], ‘consciousness (*rnam par shes pa, vijñāna*) is conditioned by mental formations (*’du byed, saṃskāra*)’, because mental formations foster the seed of consciousness, [mental formations] are [considered to be] supporting conditions [for the seeds of consciousness]. [In *Mahāyānasamgraha* §I.28, it is said:] ‘Then, in the second [type of] dependent origination (i.e., the mutual causation of *ālayavijñāna* and the active types of consciousness), which condition is referred to? It refers to supporting condition’. Therefore, [the first theory is] contradictory to [another line from *Mahāyānasamgraha* §I.17:] ‘Like *ālayavijñāna*, defiled dharmas also are generative causes’.

[Proponents of the first theory may counter:] That is not the case. [Desire, etc.] are generative causes [of seeds] by fostering homogeneous seeds (i.e., seeds corresponding to respective dharmas). For example, something is [considered by] *Vaibhāṣikas* [to be] a homogenous cause of something else due to their homogeneity. Supporting condition is [called so] because [some dharma] fosters a heterogeneous imprint.

de la rnam par rtog pa dang po la gleng bar bya ste / ’dod chags la sogs pa ni yons su gso ba tsam du nye bar gnas pa’i phyir rgyu’i rkyen du mi ’grub ste / dper na ’du byed kyi rkyen gyis rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba ’di la ’du byed rnam par shes pa’i a bon yongs su gso bar byed pa yin pa’i phyir bdag po’i rkyen nyid yin pa lta bu’o // ’o na rten cing ’brel bar ’byun ba gnyis pa la gang gi rkyen zhes bya zhe na / bdag po’i rkyen to zhes ’byung ba’i yang phyir te / des na kun gzhi’i rnam par shes pa ji lta ba de bzhin du kun nas nyon mongs pa’i chos rnams kyang rgyu’i rkyen yin no zhes bya ba ’di ’gal lo //

Dharmas adhere to the consciousness, and, similarly, consciousness to dharmas.

They are always each other’s result and cause.

The message of this verse is as follows:

Ālayavijñāna and the active [types of] consciousness always generate and mutually cause each other.

Mahāyānasamgraha says: ‘*Ālayavijñāna* and defiled dharmas are the generative cause of each other. It is just like a wick that generates a flame and a flame that burns the wick. It is also like bundles of reeds that support one another. Only with regard to these two is generative cause established, because it cannot be found elsewhere. If seeds are generated without infusion, how can active [types of] consciousness be the generative cause for *ālayavijñāna*? [Something that merely] fosters [something else] through infusion cannot be called a generative cause. [If it could,] good and bad karmas would be the generative cause for the resulting karmic retribution (*vipākaphala*). Also, various scriptural passages say: ‘Seeds are generated through infusion’. All this goes against their argument. Therefore, [arguing that there are] only primordial seeds contradicts reason and scriptures.

若唯本有，轉識不應與阿賴耶為因緣性，如契經(=《大乘阿毘達摩經》)說，

諸法於識藏 識於法亦爾。

更互為果性 亦常為因性。

此頌意言，阿賴耶識，與諸轉識，於一切時，展轉相生，互為因果。《攝大乘》說，阿賴耶識，與雜染法，互為因緣。如炷與焰展轉生燒。又如束蘆互相依住。唯依此二，建立因緣。所餘因緣，不可得故。若諸種子，不由熏生，如何轉識，與阿賴耶，有因緣義。非熏令長，可名因緣。勿言惡業，與異熟果，為因緣故。又諸聖教，說有種子，由熏習生，皆違彼義。故唯本有，理教相違。

de ni ma yin te / rigs mthun pa'i sa bon
 yongs su gsos pas rgyu'i rkyen nyid yin te
 / dper na bye brag tu smra ba'i skal pa
 mnyam pa'i rgyu rdzas gzhan nyid skal pa
 mnyam pa'i phyir rdzas gzhan gyi yin pa
 lta bu'o // bdag po'i rkyen ni mi 'dra ba'i
 bag chags yongs su gsos pa'i phyir yin no //

Next, the *Vivṛtaguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā* passage quoted in Table 9 raises the following question regarding the first theory (primordial imprints): if dharmas such as desire merely foster already existing imprints, then these dharmas can only be supporting conditions (*adhipatipratyaya*) and cannot be generative causes (*hetupratyaya*). *Vivṛtaguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā* points out that this argument contradicts the following line of *Mahāyānasamgraha*: 'Like *ālayavijñāna*, defiled dharmas also are generative causes'.

Based on a verse in *Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra* (*Dasheng apidamo jing* 大乘阿毘達摩經 [Sūtra on Mahāyānist Abhidharma]), *Cheng weishi lun* states: '*Ālayavijñāna* and the active [types of] consciousness (*zhuanshi* 轉識, *pravṛttivijñāna*) always generate and mutually cause each other.'

In response to these arguments, those who accept the existence of primordial imprints in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā* state: If a dharma fosters its homogeneous seed, it is a generative cause (*hetupratyaya*). If a dharma fosters a heterogeneous imprint, it is a supporting condition (*adhipatipratyaya*). In this case, desire, etc., foster homogeneous imprints, and therefore there is no problem for desire, etc., to be regarded as the *hetupratyaya* of pre-existing imprints.

On the basis of the same verse in *Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra*, *Cheng weishi lun* states: All dharmas and *ālayavijñāna* function as the generative cause of each other. If the active types of consciousness (tantamount to all dharmas in the *cittamātra* framework) do not generate but simply foster seeds, then these types of consciousness cannot be *hetupratyaya*. The purport of this argument aligns exactly with that of *Vivṛtaguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā*.

TABLE 10 Third Theory: Critique of the First Theory: (Imprint without Infusion [Scenting])

<i>Vivṛtaguhyārthapaṇḍavyākhyā</i>	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
<p>Also, if [proponents of the second theory] ask, ‘Since <u>nothing similar</u> (i.e., imprints of fragrance without infusion) <u>can be found in sesame [oil], etc., how can imprints exist naturally</u> (before being infused)?’, it is not reasonable. Even when garlic, stones, etc., come together with flowers, it is observed that the fragrance of these [flowers] is not retained. Therefore, we know that it is precisely due to their nature that sesame [oil], etc., are capable of retaining the fragrance [of flowers].</p> <p><i>’on te til la sogs pa la de lta bu ma mthong pa’i phyir ji ltar chos nyid kyis gnas pa’i bag chags su ’gyur zbe na / de ni rigs pa ma yin te / sgog skya dang rdo la sogs pa la me tog dang phrad kyang de’i dri mi ’dzin pa snang ba’i phyir til la sogs pa la chos nyid kho nas dri ’dzin pa’i nus pa yod do zhes bya bar shes so // gzhan yang sems dang sems las byung ba la ma gtogs pa’i dngos po med pa’i phyir til la sogs pa ni med pa kho na’i / ’jig rten gyi grags par bag chags kyī rten nyid du grags pas bag chags ’byung ba la sogs pa’i dpe tsam du byas pa ’ba’ zbig tu zad na ji ltar de dang ’dra bar thal bar ’gyur /</i></p>	<p>Cf. (Second Theory) Other [Yogācāras] maintain that all seeds are generated as a result of infusion. The infuser and the infused both have existed from time immemorial. Therefore, seeds have been established from time immemorial. ‘Seed’ is another appellation for ‘imprint’, and imprints always awaits infusion (lit. <u>scenting</u>), just like the fragrance in sesame [oil] that is generated because it has been scented by flowers.</p> <p>有義種子，皆熏故生。所熏能熏，俱無始有。故諸種子，無始成就。種子既是習氣異名，習氣必由熏習而有。如麻香氣，花熏故生。 (T no. 1585, 31: 2.8b6–9)</p>
<p>Furthermore, since nothing is real apart from mind and mental functions, sesame [oil], etc., definitely do not exist. Since it is accepted in worldly consensus that [sesame oil, etc., are] the basis for the residue [or ‘imprint’ of fragrance], how could it follow that they are [really] like those [imprints] if they are simply taken as mere similes for the arising of imprints, etc.?</p> <p><i>gzhan yang sems dang sems las byung ba la ma gtogs pa’i dngos po med pa’i phyir til la sogs pa ni med pa kho na’i / ’jig rten gyi grags par bag chags kyī rten nyid du grags pas bag chags ’byung ba la sogs pa’i dpe tsam du byas pa ’ba’ zbig tu zad na ji ltar de dang ’dra bar thal bar ’gyur /</i></p>	

The counterargument by proponents of the second theory in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* shown in Table 10 is as follows: Sesame oil cannot have fragrance without infusion (scenting). In the same way, there is no naturally existing imprint. Proponents of the first theory respond: Sesame oil has the natural ability to retain fragrance, unlike scallions and stones, which do not have that capacity. Therefore, the notion of naturally existing imprint is not unreasonable. Also, sesame oil is only a metaphor for infusion of fragrance; it cannot fully illustrate the doctrine of infusion. In brief, the existence of imprints without infusion is not a problem.

This argument has no direct counterpart in the corresponding portion of *Cheng weishi lun*. However, the idea that ‘imprints must be infused to exist, just as sesame oil must be infused to have a fragrance’ in *Cheng weishi lun* resonates with the argument in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* that there is no fragrance without infusion.

TABLE 11 Third theory: Critique of the Second Theory (Seeds of Ālayavijñāna)

<i>Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā</i>	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
<p>Some criticize the second theory [as follows:] ‘Since <i>ālayavijñāna</i> does not arise and perish simultaneously with another <i>ālayavijñāna</i>, there cannot be an imprint that causes the arising of the [<i>ālayavijñāna</i>]’.</p> <p><i>rnam par rtog pa gnyis pa la yang kha cig gleng ba / kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa ni kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa gzhan dang lhan cig skye ba dang 'gag pa med pa'i phyir de skye ba'i rgyu mtshan gyi bag chags su mi 'gyur ro zhe'o //</i></p>	
<p>If [proponents of the second theory object, saying], ‘Did we not say that the mental consciousness that is similar to [<i>ālayavijñāna</i> as its] cognitive object generates the imprint [of <i>ālayavijñāna</i>]?’; it is not reasonable.</p> <p><i>dmigs pa 'dra ba'i yid kyi rnam par shes pas bag chags bskyed do zhes bshad pa ma yin nam zhe na / de ni rigs pa ma yin te /</i></p>	<p>(Elsewhere: <i>Cheng weishi lun shuji</i>) Regarding the portion of the treatise (<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>) from ‘only the seven [types of] active consciousness (<i>zhuanshi</i> 轉識, <i>pravṛttivijñāna</i>)’ to ‘can be the infuser’, the commentary (<i>Shuji</i>) says: This is the conclusion. Namely, from among the cognizing subjects, the seven [types of] active consciousness</p>

and their mental functions are the infusers. If [one asks:] ‘What is struck by the image portion?’ (i.e., what is the cognitive object of the image portion?), [the answer] is that, because the eighth [type of] consciousness is a cognitive object of the sixth and seventh [types of] consciousness, the image portions [of the two types of consciousness] infuse [the seeds of *ālayavijñāna*].

(《成唯識論述記》) 論：唯七轉識，至可是能熏。述曰：總結也。即能緣中七轉識、心所等為能熏。若為相分，何法為障？即第八識為六、七識之所緣，故為相分熏。(T no. 1830, 43: 3.314c12–15)

(*Elsewhere*) The eighth [type of] consciousness can be the cognitive object of the first seven [types of] consciousness, because they can infuse the seeds of the image and the cognizing portions of that *ālayavijñāna*.

前七於八所緣容有能熏成彼相見種故。(T no. 1585, 31: 8.42c17–18)

(*Elsewhere: Shuji*) If the sixth [type of] consciousness cognizes the image and cognizing portions of the eighth [type of] consciousness, it infuses their seeds. Namely, it infuses the seeds of both portions [of *ālayavijñāna*].

(《成唯識論述記》) 第六識若緣第八見·相而熏種，即雙熏彼二分種子。(T no. 1830, 43: 8.512c27–28)

The argument of the first theory of *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* quoted in Table 11 is as follows: since there is nothing that can infuse the imprints that serve as the *hetupratyaya* of *ālayavijñāna*, these imprints must be pre-existing. To this argument, proponents of the second theory counter: *ālayavijñāna* and the mental consciousness that cognizes *ālayavijñāna* are similar, therefore the mental consciousness can infuse imprints of *ālayavijñāna*. However, proponents of the first theory disagree.

As we saw regarding the second theory, this section of *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* closely resembles the the Faxiang

School's doctrine of 'infusing imprints by the image portion [of consciousness]' (*xiangfenxun* 相分熏).

TABLE 12 Third Theory: Two Types of Cognitive Objects

<i>Vivṛtagubhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā</i>	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
<p>Cognitive objects are twofold: <u>substantial</u> [dharmas] that have the nature of <u>minds</u> and mental functions and <u>insubstantial</u> [dharmas] that have the nature of <u>matter</u>. Of these, the mental consciousness that cognizes minds and mental functions generates the imprints of only these [minds and mental functions], while the [mental consciousness] that cognizes matter generates imprints that give rise only to these [material dharmas]. Since <u>neither of them can be established as cognitive objects</u> (<i>ālambana</i>) or modes of cognition (<i>ākāra</i>) by the theory of mind-only, how can [<i>ālayavijñāna</i>] be similar to [mental consciousness] as its cognitive object?</p> <p><i>dmigs pa ni rnam pa gnyis te / sems dang sems las byung ba'i ngo bo nyid rdzas dang / gzugs kyi bdag nyid rdzas su med pa'o // de la sems dang sems las byung ba la dmigs pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa gang yin pa des ni / de dag kho na bskyed par bya ba'i phyir bag chags skyed la / gzugs la dmigs pa gang yin pa des de kho na bskyed par bya ba'i phyir ro // sems tsam nyid kyi lugs kyis ni gnyi ga ltar yang dmigs pa dang rnam pa ma grub pa'i phyir ji ltar na dmigs pa'i sgo nas 'dra bar 'gyur /</i></p>	<p>(<i>Elsewhere</i>) [Objection:] <u>External matter does not exist substantially</u>, and therefore it is admissible [to say] that it is not the object of inner consciousness. <u>Other people's minds exist substantially</u>. How can they not be <u>the cognitive objects of one's [consciousness]</u>?</p> <p>[Response:] Who said that the minds of others are not the <u>object of one's own consciousness</u>? We merely do not say that they are <u>direct cognitive objects</u>. Namely, when consciousness arises, it has no substantial function, unlike hands, etc., which directly grasp external objects, and the sun, which emits rays and directly illuminates the external objects. Just like mirrors, etc., [consciousness] appears like the external objects. This is called cognizing others' minds. It is not that [consciousness] can directly cognize them. What [the consciousness] directly cognizes is [the images] developed by one's own [consciousness]. Therefore, [<i>Sandhinirmocana</i>] <i>sūtra</i> says: 'There is not a single dharma that can grasp other dharmas. When consciousness arises, it merely appears like the image of the [object]. This is called grasping objects. Cognizing other minds, matter, etc., is just the same.'</p> <p>外色實無可非內識境。他心實有，寧非自所緣。 誰說他心非自識境。但不說彼是親所緣。謂識生時，無實作用。非如手等親執外物，日等舒光親照外境。但如鏡等，似外境現，名了他心。非親能了。親所了者，謂自所變。故契經言：無有少法，能取餘法。但識生時，似彼相現，名取彼物。如緣他心、色等亦爾。(T no. 1585, 31: 7.39c9–16)</p>

Alternatively, cognitive objects are also twofold in terms of direct and indirect cognitive objects. Of these, the direct cognitive object [of mental consciousness] is the apprehended aspect [of mental consciousness itself]. The indirect object is *ālayavijñāna*, because due to its power the apprehended aspect [of mental consciousness] appears.

*'on te mngon sum du dmigs pa dang
brgyud pa'i sgo nas gzhan du rnam pa
gnyis te / de la mngon sum gyi dmigs pa ni
gzung pa'i rnam pa gang yin pa'o / brgyud
pa'i dmigs pa ni kun gzhi'i rnam par shes
pa ste / de'i dbang gis gzung ba'i rnam par
snang ba'i phyir ro //*

(*Elsewhere*) The third condition: cognitive objects. Namely, if an extant dharma is cognized and relied on by minds or mental functions that have the image of that [dharma, it is a cognitive object]. There are two [types of cognitive objects]: One is direct, and the other is indirect. If something is not substantially apart from the cognizing subject and is an internal object to be cognized and relied on by the cognizing portion, etc., it should be known as the direct cognitive object. If something, even if it is substantially separated from the cognizing subject, acts as an external object and produces an internal object to be cognized and relied on, it should be known as the indirect cognitive object.

A direct cognitive object exists for all cognizing subjects, because without an inner object to be cognized and relied on, no [cognizing subject] arises.

An indirect cognitive object in some, but now all, cases exists and for a cognizing subject, because even without an external object to be cognized and relied on, [a cognizing subject] can also arise.¹⁰⁸

三所緣緣，謂若有法，是帶已相，心或相應，所慮所託。此體有二，一親二疎。

若與能緣，體不相離。是見分等，內所慮託。應知彼是親所緣緣。

若與能緣，體雖相離，為質能起，內所慮託，應知彼是疎所緣緣。

親所緣緣，能緣皆有。離內所慮，託必不生故，疎所緣緣，能緣或有。離外所慮，託亦得生故。(T no. 1585, 31: 7.40c14–21)

Therefore, if [you] think, ‘Why is [the mental consciousness], which cognizes the substantially existent [*ālayavijñāna*] as an indirectly object, not similar to [*ālayavijñāna*] as the cognitive object?’, this position also [has the following problem:] Due also to the power of minds and mental functions of other [people],

(*Elsewhere: Yuqielun ji*) In the western country (i.e., India), there are two interpretations. The first maintains that when ordinary beings, practitioners of the two vehicles, and bodhisattavas, who have attained the supernatural power of mind-reading wisdom, cognize another person’s mind, the image portion as a

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Sangpo and Chödrön, trans. *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*, 722–26.

mental consciousness apprehending the cognitive object and the cognizing mode arises. Therefore, since the imprints generated by that [mental consciousness] would be the generative causes of the minds and mental functions of other beings, it would follow that all sentient beings are reduced to [just] one mental continuity. Even if only [one's own] mental continuity is the cognitive object, [according to the mind-only theory mentioned above] neither the cognitive object nor the cognitive mode is established. Therefore, neither the cognitive object nor the cognitive mode is similar [to *ālayavijñāna*], [and] the seeds of that [*ālayavijñāna* can] exist [only naturally].

de bas na brgyud pa'i dmigs pa'i sgo nas rdzas su yod pa la dmigs pa ni ji ltar na dmigs pa'i sgo nas mi 'dra snyam du sems na / rtog pa 'di la yang gzhan gyi sems dang sems las byung ba'i dbang gis kyang yid kyī rnam par shes pa dmigs pa dang rnam pa yongs su 'dzin par skye ba'i phyir / des bskyed pa'i bag chags gzhan gyi sems dang sems las byung ba rnams kyī rgyu'i rkyen du 'gyur bas sems can thams cad rgyud gcig pa nyid du thal bar 'gyur ro // rgyud de dmigs pa nyid yin na yang dmigs pa dang rnam pa yongs su ma grub pa'i phyir dmigs pa dang rnam pa mi 'dra ba de'i son 'dug go //

reflection [of the object] resembles the external object because cognitions with mental discrimination are unclear and, in many cases, do not match the external object. Even though Buddhas' mind-reading wisdom also has reflected images, they precisely match the external object, and [the wisdom] clearly perceives it. Therefore, it is said that Buddhas can recognize things as they are.

(《瑜伽論記》) 西國二解。一云，凡夫二乘及諸菩薩，他心智通，緣他心時，相分影像，似彼本質。以有分別，見不明了，不多稱質。佛他心智，雖有影像，極稱本質，名了了知，故名諸佛如實能知。(T no. 1828 42: 9.519a13–17)

In Table 12, proponents of the first theory (pre-existing imprints) of *Vivṛtagubhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* counter: From the point of view of mind-only, there can be no cognitive object. Therefore, mental consciousness and its cognitive object, *ālayavijñāna*, cannot be similar. In response, proponents of the second theory (newly infused imprints) argue: Cognitive objects are twofold: direct and indirect. *Ālayavijñāna* is an indirect object of mental consciousness and is real even according to the principle of mind-only. Therefore, *ālayavijñāna* and mental consciousness can be similar. Accordingly, mental consciousness can infuse imprints of *ālayavijñāna*.

According to *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā*, the response in support of the first theory is as follows: If this is the case, because another person's mind can also be an indirect object of one's mental consciousness, that person's mind and one's own mental consciousness are similar. It should follow that one's own mental consciousness can infuse imprints of the other person's mind. Thus, infused imprints must be the generative cause of the other person's mind. If so, there should be no distinction between people's minds. This is clearly unreasonable. Therefore, mental consciousness cannot infuse the imprints of *ālayavijñāna*. The imprints that serve as the generative cause of *ālayavijñāna* must be pre-existing ones.

While there is no direct counterpart to this argument in the relevant portion of *Cheng weishi lun*, this argument in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* presupposes that there are two kinds of cognitive objects. This corresponds to the theory of direct cognitive object (*qin suoyuanyuan* 親所緣) and indirect cognitive object (*shu suoyuanyuan* 疏所緣) in *Cheng weishi lun*. *Cheng weishi lun* also states that another person's mind is an indirect cognitive object of one's own consciousness. *Yuqielun ji* 瑜伽論記 also records 'two interpretations in the western country (i.e., India)'. According to the first interpretation, when one cognizes another person's mind, the reflection (*yingxiang* 影像, *pratibimba*), which is the image portion (i.e., the direct cognitive object) of the cognizing mind, resembles the external object (*benzhi* 本質, *bimba*, i.e., the indirect cognitive object). This argument is also relevant to the theories presented in both *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* and *Cheng weishi lun*.

TABLE 13 Third Theory: *Tathatālabhanapratyayabīja*

<i>Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā</i>	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
Moreover, [the second theory] argues as follows: 'The <i>gotra</i> [that is present] by nature [means that] the hindrance of defilements and the hindrance to the knowable are thin. The noble paths have no generative cause'. [This] is not reasonable either because the following [statement] appears in	If [seeds] were only newly generated, <u>conditioned but undefiled [dharmas]</u> (<i>youwei wulou</i> 有爲無漏, <i>anāsravasamskrta</i> , i.e., undefiled wisdom [<i>anāsravajñāna</i>]) could not arise because <u>they would have no generative cause</u> . Defiled [seeds] cannot be the seeds of undefiled [dharmas]. [If they could,]

[*Bodhisattvabhūmi*]: ‘The *gotra* that is present by nature is the distinctive [state] of the six *āyatanas*’. [This argument of the second theory is unreasonable] also because, according to all [Buddhist] schools, all minds and mental functions arise depending on the four conditions. [Therefore, we] can consider that [the mention of] ‘the attenuated seeds of hindrance’ found in *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* has the hidden intention of showing the existence of the undefiled natural seeds.
gang yang rang bzhin gyi rigs nyon mongs pa dang shes bya'i sgrib pa sraḥ pa yin no // 'phags pa'i lam la rgyu'i rkyen med do zhes smras pa gang yin pa de yang rigs pa ma yin te / rang bzhin du gnas pa'i rigs ni skye mched drug gi khyad par ro zhes 'byung ba'i phyir dang / sde ba thams cad las kyang sems dang sems las byung ba thams cad rkyen bzhis skye bar 'byung ba'i phyir ro // rnam par gtan la dbab pa bsdu ba las 'byung ba ni sgrib pa'i sa bon sraḥ pa nyid kyis chos nyid kyī sa bon zag pa med pa yod pa nyid du bstan pa yin no zhes bya bar dgongs pa yongs su brtag par nus so //

undefiled seeds would give rise to defiled [dharmas]. Admitting that, defiled [dharmas] would arise again to Buddhas, and good [seeds], etc., would be the seeds of evil [dharmas], etc.,

The real intention of the statement [in *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*] that the *gotra* distinctions are established by means of the hindrances is to demonstrate the presence or absence of undefiled seeds. Namely, if [people] completely lack undefiled seeds, they can never eliminate the seeds of the two [kinds of] hindrances. They are defined as not being destined for *nirvāṇa*. If [people] have only the undefiled seeds of the two vehicles, they can never eliminate the seeds of the hindrance to the knowable. Some [of these people] are defined as having *śrāvaka-gotra*, while the others are defined as having *pratyekabuddha-gotra*. If [people] further have the undefiled seeds of Buddhas, they can ultimately eliminate those two [kinds of] hindrances. They are defined as having *tathāgata-gotra*. Therefore, due to the presence or absence of undefiled seeds, the hindrances can or cannot be eliminated. Nevertheless, undefiled seeds are subtle, hidden, and hard to know. Therefore, the *gotra* distinctions are revealed by these distinctions of hindrances. Otherwise, what differences are there among these hindrances that would make them subject to elimination or not? If [the proponents of this theory] say that there naturally are these distinctions of hindrances, how do they not accept the same [argument] regarding undefiled seeds? If originally there were absolutely no undefiled seed, the noble paths could never arise. Who could eliminate the seeds of the two [kinds of] hindrances, and how could one say that the *gotra* distinctions are established by means of the hindrances? Since the noble paths would never [be able to] arise, arguing that they could arise in the future definitely does not make sense. Moreover, various scriptural

passages concerning the existence of primordial seeds all contradict this argument. Therefore, the theory that only admits newly generated [seeds] contradicts reason and scriptures. Accordingly, one should know that each of the seeds of various dharmas is twofold: primordial and newly generated.

若唯始起，有爲無漏，無因緣故，應不得生。有漏不應爲無漏種，勿無漏種生有漏故。許應諸佛，有漏復生。善等應爲，不善等種。……

(《瑜伽師地論·攝決擇分》) 依障建立種姓別者，意顯無漏種子有無。謂若全無無漏種者，彼二障種，永不可害，即立彼爲非涅槃法。若唯有二乘無漏種者，彼所知障種，永不可害。一分立爲聲聞種姓，一分立爲獨覺種姓。若亦有佛無漏種者，彼二障種，俱可永害。即立彼爲如來種姓。故由無漏種子有無障，有可斷、不可斷義，然無漏種，微隱難知，故約彼障，顯性差別。……然諸聖教，處處說有本有種子，皆違彼義。故唯始起理教相違。由此應知，諸法種子，各有本有，始起二類。

This last argument in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* quoted in Table 13 refutes the argument found in the *tathatālambanaprāryaya-bīja* section of *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* and posits instead the naturally existing *gotra*, i.e. the primordial undefiled seed. *Cheng weishi lun* also rejects the theory in the same section of *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* and advocates instead the existence of the pre-existing (undefiled) seeds. In this regard, the views presented in both texts clearly align.

Thus far, we have confirmed that *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* and *Cheng weishi lun* contain three very similar arguments on the origin of seeds or imprints. Regarding this, one possible scenario might be that the Chinese text of *Cheng weishi lun* somehow influenced *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* (*Don gsang ba rnam par phye ba bsdus te bshad pa*) in Tibet.

However, as I have pointed out,¹⁰⁹ Vinītadeva's *Triṃśikaṭīkā* (*Sum*

¹⁰⁹ Yamabe, 'Shūji no honnu to shinkun (II)', 95, note 3.

cu pa'i 'grel bshad) also enumerates three similar theories.

Yogācāras have three accounts.

Some say that previously nonexistent imprints arise.

Others say that imprints exist all the time. Defiled dharmas foster them, and owing to the fostering they can give rise to their result.

Yet others say that previously existent imprints are fostered, and previously nonexistent imprints are also generated.

rnal 'byor spyod pa rnams kyi lo rgyus rnam pa gsum ste /
 kha cig ni sngon med pa nyid kyi bag chags skyed do zhes zer /
 gzhan dag na re bag chags ni dus thams cad na yod pa de ni kun nas
 nyon mongs pa'i chos rnams kyis yongs su brtas¹¹⁰ par byed par zad
 de yongs su brtas¹¹¹ nas de'i 'bras bu mngon par bsgrub nus so zhes
 zer /
 gzhan dag ni snga ma nas yod pa'i bag chags kyang yongs su brtas¹¹²
 par byed la sngon med pa dag kyan skyed do¹¹³ snyam du sems so //¹¹⁴

This independently confirms that these three theories were current in Indian *Yogācāra*. We should also note, however, that, as has been indicated above, there are arguments in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* that do not directly correspond to *Cheng weishi lun*. For this reason, too, it is less likely that the relevant portion of *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* was copied from *Cheng weishi lun*.

It is thus more likely that the similarities between the three theories found in *Vivṛtaguhyārthapīṇḍavyākhyā* and *Cheng weishi lun* cast doubt on the 'compilational' origin of *Cheng weishi lun*.

¹¹⁰ Pek. Narthang, *rtas*.

¹¹¹ Pek. Narthang, *rtas*.

¹¹² Pek. Narthang, *rtas*.

¹¹³ A note in Chibetto Butten Fukyūkai's edition claims that Derge edition here has *de*, although as a matter of fact the Derge edition (Hi, 13b3) also has *do*.

¹¹⁴ Chibetto Butten Fukyūkai, ed., *Chibetto bun*, 40; for Japanese translation, see Yamaguchi and Nozawa, *Seshin yuisiki no genten kaimei*, 198.

5. *Yogācārabhūmivyākhyā* and *Cheng Weishi Lun* Regarding *Tathatālambanapratyayabīja*

To approach this question from a broader perspective, let us now examine *Yogācārabhūmivyākhyā* (*rNal 'byor spyod pa'i sa rnam par bshad pa*, Derge No. 4043; Pek. No. 5544) below. *Yogācārabhūmivyākhyā* is an Indian commentary on *Yogācārabhūmi* extant in a partial Tibetan translation (and an abridged Chinese translation, entitled *Yuqieshi di lun shi* 瑜伽師地論釋 [T no. 1580]). *Yogācārabhūmivyākhyā* gives a detailed analysis of the following line from *Manobhūmi* of the Basic Section of *Yogācārabhūmi*:

And the consciousness that contains all seeds (*sarvabījakam vijñānam*) of those who are destined for *nirvāṇa* (*parinirvāṇadharmaka*) has complete seeds. But the [consciousness] of those who are not destined for *nirvāṇa* (*aparinirvāṇadharmaka*) lacks the seeds of the three kinds of bodhis.

復次，此一切種子識，若般涅槃法者，一切種子，皆悉具足。不般涅槃法者，便闕三種菩提種子。(T no. 30: 2.284a29–b2 [No. 1579])

tat punaḥ sarvabījakam vijñānam parinirvāṇadharmakāṇaṃ paripūrṇabījam aparinirvāṇadharmakāṇaṃ punas trividhabodhibījavikalam || (*Manobhūmi*, *Yogācārabhūmi*, V. Bhattacharya ed., 25.1–2)

5.1. Translations

Yogācārabhūmivyākhyā (Derge 'i 92b3–93b5; Pek. Yi 112b4–114a2) discusses the phrase, ‘complete seeds’ (*paripūrṇabījam*) as follows:

Regarding [the expression,] ‘complete seeds’;

Some say: This refers to the potentialities of defiled and undefiled dharmas that exist [in the consciousness that contains all seeds].

Others say: Seeds of supramundane dharmas do not exist in *ālayavijñāna*, because it is said in the treatise (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*) that supramundane dharmas arise from *tathatālambanapratyayabīja* and not from the seeds that are accumulated imprints.¹¹⁵

sa bon yongs su tshang¹¹⁶ ba yin no¹¹⁷ zhes bya ba ni
 kha cig na re zag pa dang bcas pa dang zag pa med pa'i chos rnams kyi
 nus pa yod pa la bya'o¹¹⁸ zhes zer ro //
 kha cig na re kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la ni 'jig rten las 'das pa'i
 chos kyi sa bon med de / 'di ltar 'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos rnams ni
 de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i rkyen gyi sa bon las byung ba yin gyi /
 de'i bag chags bsags pa'i sa bon¹¹⁹ las byung ba ma yin no¹²⁰ zhes
 bstan bcos las 'byung ngo¹²¹ zhes zer ro // (Derge 'i 92b3–5; Pek. Yi
 112b4–7)

Regarding this, proponents of the former position respond: The purport of the treatise (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*) is as follows: Seeds fostered by *tathatālambanapratyaya* are the causes [of supramundane dharmas], but the accumulated imprints of *dauṣṭhulyas* are not,¹²² because these [accumulated imprints] belong to the class of *dauṣṭhulya*.¹²³

¹¹⁵ smras pa / 'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos rnams ni de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i rkyen gyi sa bon dang ldan par skye ba'i bag chags bsags pa'i sa bon dang ldan pa ni ma yin no // (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, D. Zhi 27b4–5; Pek. Zi 30a8–b1)

Yuqieshi di lun 瑜伽師地論, T no. 1579, 30: 52.589a16–17: 答: 諸出世間法, 從真如所緣緣種子生, 非彼習氣積集種子所生. See Yamabe, 'Shinnyo shoennen shūji'.

¹¹⁶ Pek. *tsba nga*.

¹¹⁷ Pek. adds //.

¹¹⁸ Pek. adds //.

¹¹⁹ Pek. *sa* instead of *sa bon*.

¹²⁰ Pek. adds //.

¹²¹ Pek. adds //.

¹²² Depending on the context, *gnas ngan len* (*dauṣṭhulya*, 龐重) can mean active defilements, their seeds, or inertness of body and mind.

¹²³ gal te bag chags des sa bon thams cad bsdus la# / de yang kun du 'gro ba'i gnas ngan len zhes## bya bar gyur na / de ltar na 'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos rnams skye ba'i sa bon gang yin / de dag skye ba'i sa bon gyi dngos po gnas ngan len gyi rang bzhin can yin par ni mi rung ngo zhe na / (D. Zhi 27b3–4; Pek. Zi 30a7–8).

D. pa.

de la phyogs snga ma smra ba dag gis lan btab pa / bstan bcos kyi don ni 'di yin te / de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i rkyen rnams kyi¹²⁴ sa bon rtas¹²⁵ par bya ba ni de dag gi rgyu yin gyi gnas ngan len gyi bag chags bsags pa ni ma yin te / 'di ltar de ni gnas ngan len gyi skabs yin pa'i phyir ro // (Derge 'i 92b5–6; Pek. Yi 112b7–8)

If there were no undefiled seeds in [*ālaya*]*vijñāna*, then it would be unreasonable to say that, from the beginning, these [people] have *śrāvaka*-, *pratyekabuddha*-, and *tathāgata-gotra*s, while those [people] have no *gotra*. Therefore, *gotra*, which is another appellation for the seed that causes the arising of undefiled dharmas, exists.

rnam par shes pa la zag pa¹²⁶ med pa'i sa bon med na ni dang po nyid nas 'di ni nyan thos dang rang sang rgyas dang de bzhin gshegs pa'i rigs can dang / de dag gi rigs med pa'o¹²⁷ zhes rnam par gzhag pa kho na yang mi rigs par 'gyur bas / de'i phyir zag pa med pa'i chos rnams 'byung ba'i rgyus sa bon gyi rnam grangs kyi rigs yod do // (Derge 'i 92b6–7; Pek. Yi 112b8–113a2)

[If there were no *gotra*,] the three types of bodhis as distinct results [of the three vehicles] would not exist either, because [*tathatā* as] cognitive object is not differentiated [for the three vehicles].¹²⁸ When

Pek. ces.

Yugieshi di lun, T no. 1579, 30: 52.589a13–16: 問: 若此習氣, 攝一切種子, 復名遍行龐重者, 諸出世間法, 從何種子生? 若言龐重自性種子為種子生, 不應道理.

¹²⁴ D. *kyi*.

¹²⁵ D. *brtas*.

¹²⁶ Pek. omits *pa*.

¹²⁷ Pek. adds //.

¹²⁸ gal te bag chags bsags pa'i sa bon dang ldan par skye ba ma yin na / de lta na ni ci'i phyir gang zag yong su mya ngan las 'das pa'i chos can gyi rigs gsum rnam par gzhag# pa dang / gang zag yong su mya ngan las mi 'da' ba'i chos can gyi rigs rnam par gzhag pa mdzad de / 'di ltar thams cad la yang de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i rkyen yod pa'i phyir ro zhe na / (D. Zhi 27b5–6; Pek. Zi 30b1–3).

something that makes one yearn for *tathatā* (i.e., *gotra*) exists, some [people] thus undertake to remove [the hindrance of] defilements (i.e., *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*), and other [people] undertake to remove the hindrance to the knowable (i.e., bodhisattvas). Therefore, it should be accepted that there is a cause (i.e., *gotra*) in a [mental] continuity.

'bras bu'i bye brag byang chub rnam gsum yang med par 'gyur te / dmigs pa tha dad pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro // de bzhin nyid la 'dod pa bzhin byed pa ci zhig yod na 'di ltar gcig la ni nyon mongs pa spang ba'i phyir nye bar gnas la / gcig ni shes bya'i sgrib pa spang ba'i phyir nye bar gnas par 'gyur te / de'i phyir rgyud la gnas pa'i rgyu yod par 'dod par bya'o // (Derge 'i 92b7–93a2; Pek. Yi 113a2–4)

Proponents of the second theory say: A treatise cannot be interpreted in a different way (i.e., should be understood literally). It is taught forcefully [in *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*]: 'If all seeds are subsumed under *dauṣṭhulya*, what seeds will give rise to supramundane dharmas? It is not reasonable that their cause is the seed of *dauṣṭhulya*'.¹²⁹ The establishment of *gotra* is also taught in the same text [*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*]: 'If people's [mental] continuities contain the seed of an ultimate hindrance to the penetration to *tathatā* as cognitive object, they have the *gotra* not destined for *nirvāṇa*. If there is no seed of the hindrance of defilement in the [mental] continuities but there is a seed of an ultimate hindrance to the knowable, some [people] are established as having *śrāvaka-gotra*, and the others as having *pratyekabuddha-gotra*. If they have neither of them, they have *tathāgata-gotra*'.¹³⁰ The establishment of the results [of the three vehicles] is also taught in the same [treatise].

Pek. *bzhag*.

Yuqieshi di lun, T no. 1579, 30: 52.589a17–21: 問: 若非習氣積集種子所生者, 何因緣故, 建立三種般涅槃法種性差別補特伽羅, 及建立不般涅槃法種性補特伽羅. 所以者何? 一切皆有真如所緣緣故.

¹²⁹ See n. 123.

¹³⁰ See n. 44.

phyogs gnyis pa smra ba dag gis smras pa / bstan bcos ni gzhan du
 drang bar mi nus te / gal te gnas ngan len gyi bag chags des sa bon
 thams cad bsdus pa yin na 'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos rnam s'byung bar
 'gyur ba'i sa bon gang yin te / de dag gi rgyu gnas ngan len gyi sa bon
 yin par mi rigs so¹³¹ zhes rab tu bsgrims¹³² te bstan to zhes zer ro //
 rigs rnam par gzhag pa yang de nyid las bstan te / gang dag gi rgyud
 la de bzhin nyid la¹³³ dmigs pa rtogs^{133a} par mi 'gyur ba¹³⁴ gtan du ba'i
 sgrib pa'i sa bon yod pa de dag ni yongs su mya ngan las mi 'da' ba'i
 rigs rgyud la nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa'i sa bon ni med la / gtan du
 ba'i shes bya'i sgrib pa'i sa bon yod pa de dag ni kha cig nyan thos kyi
 rigs can yin pa dang /¹³⁵ kha cig rang sangs rgyas kyi rigs can yin par
 rnam par bzhag¹³⁶ go // gang dag la de gnyis ka med pa de dag ni de
 bzhin gshegs pa'i rigs can yin no¹³⁷ zhes 'byung ba¹³⁸ ste¹³⁹ / 'bras bu
 rnam par bzhag¹⁴⁰ pa yang de nyid kyis bstan to // (Derge 'i 93a2–5;
 Pek. Yi 113a4–8)

Other people say: If seeds of bodhis do not exist at all, since the three kinds of [bodhis] do not exist, the seeds of the three kinds of bodhis do not exist.¹⁴¹ Accordingly, [all sentient beings must be beings] not destined for *nirvāṇa*, because it is stated in *Bodhisattvabhūmi*: 'Keen capacities (or sense faculties), etc., are the cause'¹⁴² and '[Seed]

¹³¹ Pek. adds //.

¹³² D. *bsgribs*.

¹³³ D. omits *la*.

^{133a} D. *rtog*.

¹³⁴ Pek. *pa*.

¹³⁵ D. //.

¹³⁶ D. *gzhag*.

¹³⁷ Pek. adds //.

¹³⁸ Pek. omits *ba*.

¹³⁹ See n. 44.

¹⁴⁰ D. *gzhag*.

¹⁴¹ The translation of this sentence is uncertain.

¹⁴² Cf. *tatrāyaṃ indriyakṛto viśeṣaḥ / prakṛtyaiva bodhisattvas tīkṣṇendriyo bhavati pratyekabuddho madhyendriyaḥ śrāvako mṛdvindriyaḥ /* (Wogihara, ed.,

is recognized to be ability and *gotra*'.¹⁴³ Just after 'the seeds of faith, etc.,' [are mentioned, *Manobbūmi*] says: 'They are not called *dauṣṭhulya*'.¹⁴⁴ The Āgama (*Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*) says: 'Undetermined *gotra* exists'.¹⁴⁵ [These passages from *sūtras* and treatises that accept a distinction among *gotras* cannot be explained.] Undefined *citta* and *caittas* arise from the seeds that stay in *vipākavijñāna*,

Bodhisattvabhūmi, 3.23–4.2).

Yuqieshi di lun, T no. 1579, 30: 35.478c29–479a2: 言根勝者，謂諸菩薩本性利根，獨覺中根，聲聞軟根，是名根勝。

¹⁴³ Cf. tat punar gotraṃ bījaṃ ity apy ucyate dhātuh prakṛtir ity api. (Wogihara, ed., *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, 3.6–8).

Yuqieshi di lun, T no. 1579, 30:35.478c17–18: 又此種姓，亦名種子，亦名爲界，亦名爲性。

¹⁴⁴ yāni punaḥ śraddhādikuśaladharmapakṣyāṇi bījāni teṣu naivānuśayasamjñā dauṣṭhulyasamjñā | tathā hi | teṣāṃ utpādāt karmaṇya evāśrayo bhavati nākarmaṇyaḥ | ataś ca sakalam āśrayaṃ dauṣṭhulyopagatatvād dauṣṭhulyamayāt# tathāgatā duḥkhataḥ prajñāpayanti yad uta saṃskāraduḥkhatayā || (Bhattacharya, ed., *Manobbūmi*, 26.14–17).

#Bhattacharya, ed., *dauṣṭhulyasvabhāvāt*; MS: *dauṣṭhulyamayāt*.

Yuqieshi di lun 瑜伽師地論, T no. 1879, 30: 284c6–10: 若信等善法品所攝種子，不名麤重，亦非隨眠。何以故？由此法生時，所依自體，唯有堪能非不堪能，是故一切所依自體，麤重所隨故，麤重所生故，麤重自性故，諸佛如來安立爲苦。所謂由行苦故。

¹⁴⁵ See n. 17.

Cf. *nyan thos byang chub tu yongs su 'gyur ba gang yin pa de ni ngas rnam grangs kyis byang chub sems dpa' yin par bstan te / 'di ltar de ni nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa las rnam par grol nas / de bzhin gshegs pa rnam kyis bskul na / shes bya'i sgrib pa las sems rnam par grol bar byed pa'i phyir ro // de ni dang por bdag gi don la sbyor ba'i rnam pas nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa las rnam par grol te / de'i phyir de bzhin gshegs pas de nyan thos kyi rigs su 'dogs so /* (Lamotte, ed., *Sandhinirmocanasūtra*, §7.16).

Jie shenmi jing 解深密經, T no. 676, 16: 2.695b3–8: 若迴向菩提聲聞種性補特伽羅，我亦異門說爲菩薩。何以故？彼既解脫煩惱障已，若蒙諸佛等覺悟時，於所知障，其心亦可當得解脫。由彼最初爲自利益，修行加行脫煩惱障，是故如來施設彼爲聲聞種性。

because they are endowed with [the nature of] arising just like all the defiled *citta* and *caittas*. A dissimilar dharma is space (*ākāśa*).¹⁴⁶ *Tatthatā lambana* is the seeds of supramundane dharmas, because they are the path (*lam*, *mārga*) like the mundane path. A dissimilar dharma is space (*ākāśa*).

gzhan dag gis smras pa / gal te byang chub ki sa bon med pa kho na
 yin na¹⁴⁷ //¹⁴⁸ rnam pa gsum po gang¹⁴⁹ med pas byang chub rnam
 pa¹⁵⁰ gsum gyi sa bon gang med cing yongs su mya ngan las mi 'da'
 ba'i chos can yin zhe pa¹⁵¹ / byang chub sems dpa'i sa las ni dbang
 po rnon po la sogs pa ni rgyu yin te nus pa dang rigs yin par 'dod
 do // dad pa¹⁵² la sogs pa'i sa bon mjug thogs kho nar gnas ngan len
 zhes bya ba yang med do¹⁵³ zhes kyang 'og nas 'byung ba'i phyir ro
 // lung ni gcig tu ma nges la rigs pa ni yod de / zag pa med pa'i sems
 dang sems las byung ba rnam ni rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes
 pa la gnas pa'i sa bon las byung ba yin te / 'byung ba dang ldan pa'i
 phyir ro // zag pa dang bcas pa'i sems dang sems las byung ba thams
 cad bzhin te / chos mi mthun pa ni nam mkha'o // de bzhin nyid la
 dmigs pa ni 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sa bon yin te / lam yin pa'i phyir ro
 // 'jig rten pa'i lam bzhin te / chos mi mthun pa ni nam mkha'o //
 (Derge 'i 93a5–b1; Pek. Yi 113a8–b5)

The literal [meaning of the] treatise cannot be interpreted [in a different way] because it is revealed very clearly and in detail. Therefore, both (pre-existing undefiled seeds and *tatthatā lambanapratyayabija*) can be posited, just as [both] *tatthatā* and the realization of the four

¹⁴⁶ This seems to refer to *vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta*, i.e., an example of a dissimilar element.

¹⁴⁷ D. *no*.

¹⁴⁸ Pek /.

¹⁴⁹ Pek. *grang* (?).

¹⁵⁰ Pek. omits *pa*.

¹⁵¹ D. *na*.

¹⁵² Pek. *ba*.

¹⁵³ Pek. adds //.

nobles' realities (*bden pa bzhi, catvāri āryasatyāni*) [can be] posited. There is no contradiction, as the argument has been presented in the end of *Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā bhūmiḥ*.¹⁵⁴

ji ltar bkod pa'i bstan bcos ni drang bar mi nus te / shin tu gsal bar rgya cher rnam par phye ba'i phyir ro // de'i phyir gnyis ka¹⁵⁵ yang rnam par bzhag¹⁵⁶ tu rung ste / de bzhin nyid dang bden pa bzhi mngon par rtogs pa rnam par bzhag¹⁵⁷ pa bzhin no // 'gal ba yang med do // rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga dang ldan pa'i mjug tu gtan tshigs smras zin pa'i phyir ro // (Derge 'i 93b2–3; Pek. Yi 113b5–7)

Some people say: If both (pre-existing undefiled seeds and *tathatālambda-napratyayabīja*) are posited, one should be provisional, while the other should be ultimate. This is because, for example, in this very teaching (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*), although the four nobles' realities are posited from the point of view of detailed positing, it is stated that the positing of *tathatā* is real.¹⁵⁸ That (*tathatā*)

¹⁵⁴ Cf. de'i dang por bden pa mngon par rtogs pa la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir bsgom ste / bden pa ma mthongs ba bden pa rnam la mig ma thob pas ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa sa bon thams cad pa yang rtogs par mi nus pa'i phyir ro // de de ltar zhugs shing nyan thos kyi yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa la zhugs sam / byang chub sems dpa'i yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa la zhugs te chos thams cad kyi chos kyi dbyings rtogs par byed pa na / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa yang rtogs par byed de / ... de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i shes pas kun tu brten cing goms par byas pa'i rgyus gnas 'gyur bar byed do // gnas 'gyur ma thag tu kun gzhi rnam par shes pa spangs par brjod par bya ste // (Hakamaya, *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, 405–6.

Yujiashi di lun, T no. 1579, 30: 51.581b24–c7: 能入最初聖諦現觀，非未見諦者，於諸諦中，未得法眼，便能通達一切種子阿賴耶識。此未見諦者，修如是行已，或入聲聞正性離生，或入菩薩正性離生，達一切法真法界已，亦能通達阿賴耶識。……由緣真如境智，修習多修習故而得轉依。轉依無間，當言已斷阿賴耶識。

¹⁵⁵ Pek. *gnyi ga*.

¹⁵⁶ D. *gzbag*.

¹⁵⁷ D. *gzbag*.

¹⁵⁸ *She dashenglun ben*, T no. 1579, 30: 72.697c15–17: 諦有二種：一安立諦，二非安立諦。安立諦者，謂四聖諦；非安立諦者，謂真如。

is the highest [truth], and likewise here [in the Basic Section of *Yogācārabhūmi*] also, somewhere something is said to be the highest [truth]. Because there are passages of Āgama and reasoning, here it is impossible to be definite.¹⁵⁹ This absurd statement will be settled in *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*.

kha cig gis smras pa / gal te gnyis ka rnam par bzhag¹⁶⁰ na de gnyis las gcig ni drang ba yin la gcig ni gtso¹⁶¹ bo yin par 'gyur te / dper na bstan pa 'di nyid la bden pa bzhi dag rab tu rgya cher rnam par bzhag¹⁶² pa las brtsams te rnam par bzhag¹⁶³ kyang de bzhin nyid rnam par bzhag¹⁶⁴ pa ni bden pa'o¹⁶⁵ zhes gsung pas na¹⁶⁶ / de ni gtso bo yin pa de bzhin du 'di la yang gang gtso bo yin par gang nas gsungs te / lung dang rigs pa dag gi skabs kyang yod pas 'di la ni nges par 'byung ba'i thabs med do // ha cang thal bar 'gyur ba'i brjod pa 'di¹⁶⁷ ni rnam par gtan la dbab pa bsdu ba las nges par bya ba'o // (Derge 'i 94b3–5; Pek. Yi 113b7–114a2)

5.2. Comparative Tables

A comparison of this discussion with the corresponding portions of *Cheng weishi lun* follows:

¹⁵⁹ The meaning of these two sentences is not very clear to me.

¹⁶⁰ D. *gzhag*.

¹⁶¹ D. *gco*.

¹⁶² D. *gzhag*.

¹⁶³ D. *gzhag*.

¹⁶⁴ D. *gzhag*.

¹⁶⁵ Pek. adds //.

¹⁶⁶ bden pa ni rnam pa gnyis te / rnam par bzhag pa dang / rnam par ma bzhag pa'o // de la 'phags pa'i bden pa gzhi ni rnam par bzhag pa'i bden pa yin no // de bzhin nyid ni rnam par ma bzhag pa'i bden pa yin no // (D. Zi 5a5–6; Pek. 'i 5b3–4)

¹⁶⁷ D. *pa'i di* instead of *ba 'di*.

TABLE 14 Both Defiled and Undeiled Seeds

<i>Yogācārabhūmivivākhyā</i>	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
<p>Regarding [the expression,] ‘complete seeds’; Some say: This refers to the <u>potentialities of defiled and undeiled dharmas</u> that exist [in the consciousness that contains all seeds]. <i>sa bon yongs su tshang ba yin no zhes bya ba ni</i> <i>kha cig na re zag pa dang bcas pa dang zag pa med pa'i chos rnams kyi nus pa yod pa la bya'o zhes zer ro //</i></p>	<p>(The first theory) Regarding this, some [Yogācāras] maintain that all seeds exist by nature (<i>benxing you</i> 本性有, *<i>prakṛtistha</i>). They do not arise through infusion (<i>xun[xi]</i> 熏[習]) but can only be fostered through infusion... . Based on these scriptural passages, [we can conclude] that the <u>undeiled seeds</u> exist naturally and primordially. They are not generated through infusion. <u>Defiled seeds</u> must also exist naturally. They are fostered through infusion, but they do not come into being specifically through infusion. (唯本有義) 此中有義, 一切種子, 皆本性有, 不從熏生。由熏習力, 但可增長。..... 由此等證, 無漏種子, 法爾本有, 不從熏生。有漏亦應, 法爾有種。由熏增長, 不別熏生。 (T31: 8a20–b6)</p>
<p>Others say: <u>Seeds of supramundane dharmas</u> do not exist in <i>ālayavijñāna</i>, because it is said in the treatise (<i>Viniścayasamgrahaṇī</i>) that supramundane dharmas arise from <i>tathatālanāpratyabijā</i> and not from the seeds that are accumulated imprints. <i>kha cig na re kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la ni 'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos kyi sa bon med de / 'di ltar 'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos rnams ni de bzbin nyid la dmigs pa'i rkyen gyi sa bon las byung ba yin gyi / de'i bag chags bsags pa'i sa bon las byung ba ma yin no zhes bstan bcas las 'byung ngo zhes zer ro</i></p>	<p>(The second theory) The original <i>gotra</i> distinctions among sentient beings are not [determined] by the presence or absence of undeiled seeds. These [distinctions] are established due to the presence or absence of hindrances. As [<i>Viniścayasamgrahaṇī</i> (The Collection of Doctrinal Exegeses) section of] <i>Yogā[cārabhūmi]</i>¹⁶⁸ states: If [beings] have seeds of two [kinds of] ultimate hindrances to <i>tathatā</i> as <u>object</u>, they are not destined for <i>nirvāṇa</i>. (唯新熏義) 有情本來, 種姓差別。不由無漏種子有無, 但依有障無障建立。如瑜伽 (《攝決擇分》) 說於真如境, 若有畢竟二障種者, 立為不般涅槃法性。</p>

¹⁶⁸ T no. 1579, 30: 52.589a.

In Table 14, *Yogācārabhūmividyākhyā* offers two interpretations. The first is that both defiled and undefiled seeds are retained in the *sarvabījakam vijñānam* (i.e., *ālayavijñāna*). The first theory (pre-existing seeds) in *Cheng weishi lun* also states that both defiled and undefiled seeds exist originally. On this point, the two texts completely agree.

The second interpretation is that *sarvabījakam vijñānam* contains no seeds of supramundane dharmas, because all supramundane dharmas arise from *tathatālanbanapratyayabīja*. This view denies the existence of undefiled seeds in *ālayavijñāna*. According to proponents of this theory, the generative cause of the noble paths is *tathatālanbanapratyayabīja*. This theory is evidently based on the section on *tathatālanbanapratyayabīja* in *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of *Yogācārabhūmi*. The relevant discussion in *Cheng weishi lun* is also based on the same section. Here again, the arguments in the two texts are closely related.

TABLE 15 Interpretation of *Tathatālanbanapratyayabīja*

<i>Yogācārabhūmividyākhyā</i>	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
<p>Regarding this, proponents of the former position respond: The purport of the treatise (<i>Viniścayasamgrahaṇī</i>) is as follows: Seeds fostered by <i>tathatālanbanapratyaya</i> are the causes [of supramundane dharmas], but the accumulated imprints of <i>dauṣṭhulyas</i> are not, because these [accumulated imprints] belong to the class of <i>dauṣṭhulya</i>.</p> <p><i>de la phyogs snga ma smra ba dag gis lan btab pa / bstan bcos kyi don ni 'di yin te / de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i rkyen rnamskyis sa bon rtas par bya ba ni de dag gi rgyu yin gyi gnas ngan len gyi bag chags bsags pa ni ma yin te / 'di ltar de ni gnas ngan len gyi skabs yin pa'i phyir ro //</i></p>	

If there were no undefiled seeds in [*ālaya*] *vijñāna*, then it would be unreasonable to say that, from the beginning, these [people] have the of *śrāvaka*-, *pratyekabuddha*-, and *tathāgata-gotra*, while those [people] have no *gotra*.

Therefore, *gotra*, which is another appellation for the seed that causes the arising of undefiled dharmas, exists.

rnam par shes pa la zag pa med pa'i sa bon med na ni dang po nyid nas 'di ni nyan thos dang rang sang rgyas dang de bzbin gshegs pa'i rigs can dang / de dag gi rigs med pa'o zhes rnam par gzbag pa kho na yang mi rigs par 'gyur bas / de'i phyir zag pa med pa'i chos rnams 'byung ba'i rgyus sa bon gyi rnam grangs kyi rigs yod do //

The real intention of the statement [in *Viniśayasamgrahaṇī*] that the *gotra* distinctions are established by means of the hindrances is to demonstrate the presence or absence of undefiled seeds. Namely, if [people] completely lack undefiled seeds, they can never eliminate the seeds of the two [kinds of] hindrances. They are defined as not being destined for *nirvāṇa*.

(本有、新熏合生義) [《攝決擇分》真如所緣緣種子段] 依障建立種姓別者，意顯無漏種子有無。謂若全無無漏種者，彼二障種，永不可害，即立彼為非涅槃法。(T31: 2.9a21–23)

[If there is no *gotra*,] the three types of bodhis as distinct results [of the three vehicles] would not exist either, because [*tathatā* as] cognitive object is not differentiated [for the three vehicles]. When something that makes one yearn for *tathatā* (i.e., *gotra*) exists, somebody thus undertakes to remove [the hindrance of] defilements (i.e., *śrāvaka*), and somebody else undertakes to remove the hindrance to the knowable (i.e., *bodhisattva*). Therefore, it should be admitted that there is a cause (i.e., *gotra*) in a [mental] continuity.

'bras bu'i bye brag byan chub rnam gsum yang med par 'gyur te / dmigs pa tha dad pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro // de bzbin nyid la 'dod pa bzbin byed pa ci zbig yod na 'di ltar gcig la ni nyon mongs pa spang ba'i phyir nye bar gnas la / gcig ni shes bya'i sgrub pa spang ba'i phyir nye bar gnas par 'gyur te / de'i phyir rgyud la gnas pa'i rgyu yod par 'dod par bya'o //

If [people] have only the undefiled seeds of the two vehicles, they can never eliminate the seeds of the hindrance to the knowable. Some [of these people] are defined as having *śrāvaka-gotra*, while the others are defined as having *pratyekabuddha-gotra* of. If [people] further have the undefiled seeds of Buddhas, they can ultimately eliminate those two [kinds of] hindrances. They are defined as having *tathāgata-gotra*. Therefore, due to the presence or absence of undefiled seeds, the hindrances can or cannot be eliminated. Nevertheless, undefiled seeds are subtle, hidden, and hard to know. Therefore, the *gotra* distinctions are revealed by these distinctions of hindrances. Otherwise, what differences are there among these hindrances that would make them subject to elimination or not. If [the proponents of this theory] say that there naturally are these distinctions of hindrances, how do they not accept the same [argument] regarding undefiled seeds? If originally there were absolutely no undefiled seed, the noble paths can never arise. Who could eliminate the seeds of the two [kinds of] hindrances, and how could one say that the *gotra* distinctions are established by

means of the hindrances? Since the noble paths would never [be able to] arise, arguing that they could arise in the future definitely does not make sense.

(本有、新熏合生義) 若唯有二乘無漏種者, 彼所知障種, 永不可害。一分立為聲聞種姓, 一分立為獨覺種姓。若亦有佛無漏種者, 彼二障種, 俱可永害。即立彼為如來種姓。故由無漏種子有無障有可斷不可斷義, 然無漏種微隱難知, 故約彼障顯性差別。不爾彼障, 有何別因, 而有可害不可害者, 若謂法爾, 有此障別, 無漏法種, 寧不許然? 若本全無無漏法種, 則諸聖道, 永不得生。誰當能害二障種子, 而說依障, 立種姓別。既彼聖道, 必無生義, 說當可生, 亦定非理。(T31:99a23–b5)

In Table 15, the proponents of the first theory (both defiled and undefiled seeds in *ālayavijñāna*) counter the second theory (no undefiled seeds in *ālayavijñāna*) with the suggestion that the true meaning of the relevant section of *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* is that the pre-existing undefiled seeds fostered by the *tathatālanbanapratyaya* serve as the generative causes of supramundane dharmas. Without pre-existing undefiled seeds, the *gotra* distinctions are impossible. The corresponding section of *Cheng weishi lun* proposes the same idea.

TABLE 16 Literal Interpretation of *Tathatālanbanapratyayabija*

<i>Yogācārabhūmivivākhyā</i>	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
<p>Proponents of the second theory say: A treatise cannot be interpreted in a different way (i.e., should be understood literally). It is taught forcefully [in <i>Viniścayasamgrahaṇī</i>]: ‘If all seeds are subsumed under <i>dauṣṭhulya</i>, what seeds will give rise to supramundane dharmas? It is not reasonable that their cause is the seed of <i>dauṣṭhulya</i>.’ <i>phyogs gnyis pa smra ba dag gis smras pa / bstan bcos ni gzhan du drang bar mi nus te / gal te gnas ngan len gyi bag chags des sa bon thams cad bsdus pa yin na ’jig rten las</i></p>	

*'das pa'i chos rnams 'byung bar 'gyur ba'i
sa bon gang yin te / de dag gi rgyu gnas
ngan len gyi sa bon yin par mi rigs so zhes
rab tu bsgrims te bstan to zhes zer ro //*

The establishment of *gotra* is also taught in the same text [*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*]: 'If people's [mental] continuities contain the seed of an ultimate hindrance to the penetration to *tathatā* as cognitive object in some people's [mental] continuities, they are the *gotra* not destined for *nirvāṇa*. If there is no seed of the hindrance of defilement in the [mental] continuities but there is a seed of an ultimate hindrance to the knowable, some [people] are established as having *śrāvaka-gotra*, and the others as having *pratyekabuddha-gotra*. If they have neither of them, they have *tathāgata-gotra* of.' The establishment of the results [of the three vehicles] is also taught in the same [treatise].

*rigs rnam par gzbag pa yang de nyid las
bstan te / gang dag gi rgyud la de bzhin
nyid la dmigs pa rtog par mi 'gyur ba gtan
du ba'i sgrib pa'i sa bon yod pa de dag ni
yongs su mya ngan las mi 'da' ba'i rigs
rgyud la nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa'i sa bon
ni med la / gtan du ba'i sbes bya'i sgrib
pa'i sa bon yod pa de dag ni kha cig nyan
thos kyi rigs can yin pa dang / kha cig rang
sang rgyas kyi rigs can yin par rnam par
bzbag go // gang dag la de gnyis ka med
pa de dag ni de bzhin gshogs pa'i rigs can
yin no zhes 'byung ba ste / 'bras bu rnam
par bzbag pa yang de nyid kyis bstan to //*

The original *gotra* distinctions among sentient beings are not [determined] by the presence or absence of undefiled seeds. These [distinctions] are established due to the presence or absence of hindrances. As [the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* (The Collection of Doctrinal Exegeses) section of] *Yogā[cārabhūmi]* states: If [beings] have seeds of the two [kinds of] ultimate hindrances to *tathatā* as object, they are not destined for *nirvāṇa*. If [beings] have seeds of the ultimate hindrance to the knowable but do not have [seeds of the hindrance of] defilements, some of them are called [those who have] *śrāvaka-gotra*, while the others are called [those who have] the *gotra* of *pratyekabuddha*. If [beings] have no seed of either [kind of] ultimate hindrance, they are called [those who have] *tathāgata-gotra*. Therefore, it is known that the original *gotra* distinctions are determined based on the hindrances and not on undefiled seeds.

(唯新熏義) 有情本來, 種姓差別. 不由無漏, 種子有無. 但依有障, 無障建立. 如瑜伽說, 於真如境, 若有畢竟二障種者, 立為不般涅槃法性. 若有畢竟所知障種非煩惱者, 一分立為聲聞種性, 一分立為獨覺種性. 若無畢竟二障種者, 即立彼為如來種性. 故知本來種性, 差別依障, 建立非無漏種.

In Table 16, the proponents of the second theory (no undefiled seeds in *ālayavijñāna*) respond that the relevant section of *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* requires a literal interpretation. Namely, the differences among *gotras* are explained by the presence or absence of the seeds of hindrances, not the presence or absence of undefiled seeds. This discussion is identical to the argument of the second theory in *Cheng weishi lun*.

TABLE 17 Both Pre-existing Undefined Seeds and *Tathatāmbanapratyayabīja*

<i>Yogācārabhūmivivākhyā</i>	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
<p>Other people say: If seeds of bodhis do not exist at all, since the three kinds of [bodhis] do not exist, the seeds of the three kinds of bodhis do not exist. Accordingly, [all sentient beings must be beings] not destined for <i>nirvāna</i>, because it is stated in <i>Bodhisattvabhūmi</i>: ‘Keen capacity (or sense faculties), etc., are the cause.’ and ‘[Seed] is recognized to be ability and <i>gotra</i>’. Just after ‘the seeds of faith, etc.’ [are mentioned, <i>Manobhūmi</i>] says: ‘They are not called <i>dausthulya</i>’. The Āgama (<i>Lankāvatāra-sūtra</i>) says: ‘Undetermined <i>gotra</i> exists’.</p> <p><i>gzhan dag gis smras pa / gal te byang chub ki sa bon med pa kho na yin na // rnam pa gsum po gang med pas byang chub rnam pa gsum gyi sa bon gang med cing yongs su mya ngan las mi 'da' ba'i chos can yin zhe pa / byang chub sems dpa'i sa las ni dbang po rnon po la sogs pa ni rgyu yin te nus pa dang rigs yin par 'dod do // dad pa la sogs pa'i sa bon mjug thogs kho nar gnas ngan len zhes bya ba yang med do zhes kyang 'og nas 'byung ba'i phyir ro // lung ni gcig tu ma nges la rigs pa ni yod de /</i></p>	

(thesis) Undefined *citta* and *caittas* arise from the seeds that stay in *vipākavijñāna*, (reason) because they are endowed with [the nature of] arising (simile) just like all the defiled *citta* and *caittas*. A dissimilar dharma is space (*ākāśa*).

(thesis) *Tathatāmbana* is the seeds of supramundane dharmas, (reason) because they are the path (*lam, mārga*) (simile) like the mundane path. A dissimilar dharma is space (*ākāśa*).

*zag pa med pa'i sems dang sems las byung
ba rnams ni rnam par smin pa'i rnam par
shes pa la gnas pa'i sa bon las byung
ba yin te / 'byung ba dang ldan pa'i phyir
ro // zag pa dang bcas pa'i sems dang sems
las byung ba thams cad bzhin te / chos mi*

*mtshun pa ni nam mkha'o //
de bzbin nyid la dmigs pa ni 'jig rten las
'das pa'i sa bon yin te / lam yin pa'i phyir
ro // 'jig rten pa'i lam bzbin te / chos mi
mtshun pa ni nam mkha'o //*

The literal [meaning of the] treatise cannot be interpreted [in a different way] because it is revealed very clearly and in detail. Therefore, both (pre-existing undefiled seeds and *tathatā*lambanapratyayabīja) can be posited, just as [both] *tathatā* and the realization of the four nobles' realities (*bden pa bzhi, catvāri āryasatyāni*). There is no contradiction, as the argument has been presented in the end of *Pañcaviññānakāyasaṃprayuktā bhūmiḥ. ji ltar bkod pa'i bstan bcos ni drang bar mi nus te / shin tu gsal bar rgya cher rnam par phye ba'i phyir ro // de'i phyir gnyis ka yang rnam par bzhag tu rung ste / de bzbin nyid dang bden pa bzhi mngon par rtogs pa rnam par bzhag pa bzbin no // 'gal ba yang med do // rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga dang ldan pa'i mjug tu gtan tshigs smras zin pa'i phyir ro //*

Cf. (The third theory [omitted portion in the quotation in 2.1 of this paper]) For these reasons, one should believe that sentient beings have had undefiled seeds from time immemorial. These [seeds] do not rely on infusion and are naturally established. In later advanced stages, they are fostered through infusion. These are the causes of undefiled dharmas. Once undefiled dharmas arise, they infuse their own seeds. (本有、新熏合生義) 由此應信，有諸有情，無始時來，有無漏種，不由熏習，法爾成就。後勝進位，熏令增長。無漏法起，以此為因。無漏起時，復熏成種。(T no. 1585, T31: 2.9a7–10)

Some people say: If both (pre-existing undefiled seeds and *tathatā*lambanapratyayabīja) are posited, one should be provisional, while the other should be ultimate. This is because, for example, in this very teaching (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*), although the four nobles' realities are posited from the point of view of detailed positing, it is stated that the positing of *tathatā* is real. That (*tathatā*) is the highest [truth], and likewise here [in the Basic Section of *Yogācārabhūmi*] also, somewhere something is said to be the highest [truth]. Because there are passages of Āgama and reasoning, here there is no way to be definite. This absurd statement will be settled in *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*. *kha cig gis smras pa / gal te gnyis ka rnam par bzhag na de gnyis las gcig ni drang*

ba yin la gcig ni gtso bo yin par 'gyur te /
 dper na bstan pa 'di nyid la bden pa bzhi
 dag rab tu rgya cher rnam par bzhag pa
 las brtsams te rnam par bzhag kyang de
 bzhin nyid rnam par bzhag pa ni bden
 pa'o zbes gsung pas na / de ni gtso bo yin
 pa de bzhin du 'di la yang gang gtso bo yin
 par gang nas gsungs te / lung dang rigs pa
 dag gi skabs kyang yod pas 'di la ni nges
 par 'byung ba'i thabs med do // ba cang
 thal bar 'gyur ba'i brjod pa 'di ni rnam
 par gtan la dbab pa bsdud ba las nges par
 bya ba'o //

The third theory given in *Yogācarabhūmivijñānā* (Table 17) is that the undefiled mind arises from both pre-existing undefiled seeds within the *vipākavijñāna* (the consciousness as karmic retribution, i.e., *ālayavijñāna*) and *tathatālambanapratyayabīja*. *Cheng weishi lun* explains that the undefiled wisdom (in the first moment of *darśanamārga*, 'the path of vision') arises from the pre-existing undefiled seeds, but upon entering the *darśanamārga*, undefiled seeds are newly deposited as well. These theories do not match exactly, but their approaches are perhaps somewhat similar.

Thus, in the relevant portion of *Yogācārabhūmivijñānā*, we have seen four different views:

1. *Ālayavijñāna* contains (pre-existing) undefiled seeds as well as defiled seeds.
2. *Ālayavijñāna* does not contain (pre-existing) undefiled seeds. Supramundane dharmas arise from *tathatālambanapratyayabīja*.
- 3a. Pre-existing undefiled seeds and the *tathatālambanapratyayabīja* both exist.
- 3b. If pre-existing undefiled seeds and the *tathatālambanapratyayabīja* both exist, one must be expedient, and the other must be ultimate.

Thus, though not everything agrees, the debate concerning the presence or absence of pre-existing undefiled seeds in *Yogācārabhūmi-*

vyākhyā shares many similar elements with the discussion in *Cheng weishi lun*. Both *Yogācārabhūmivyākhyā* and *Cheng weishi lun* again refer to the discussion of *tathatālambanapratyayabīja*. This shows that there is definitely a connection between the discussions in the two texts.

Particularly important to note is that *Yogācārabhūmivyākhyā* also juxtaposes distinct views on *bīja*, which it records in detail. Therefore, we can see that the inclusion of plural views in a single text does not seem to be uncommon in relatively late Indian Yogācāra texts.

6. Conclusion

Above, I have shown that *Vivṛtaguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā* and *Yogācārabhūmivyākhyā* both contain examples of different views given side by side. These views are closely tied to those recorded in *Cheng weishi lun*. This gives us the impression that juxtaposing different opinions on a single issue in the same text may have been a standard practice in later Indian Yogācāra treatises.

According to the tradition of the Faxiang School, the divergent views given within *Cheng weishi lun* are respectively derived from different commentaries on *Triṃśikā*. Based on the above discussions, however, we cannot dismiss outright the possibility that there was an Indian original similar to *Cheng weishi lun* in its current form. Needless to say, my research has examined only limited portions of *Cheng weishi lun*, and this is not sufficient for drawing a definitive conclusion. For a more comprehensive picture, much more research is required.

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Abbreviations

D	Derge. (<i>sDe dge bsTan 'gyur</i> Canon)
Pek	Peking Edition of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon
T	<i>Taishō shinshū daizōkyō</i> 大正新脩大藏經. See Bibliography, Secondary Sources, Takakusu and Watanabe, eds.

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